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Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is one of the most widely used decision 
methodologies in the sciences, business, and engineering worlds. MCDM methods aim at 
improving the quality of decisions by making the process more explicit, rational, and 
efficient. One controversial problem is that some well-known MCDM methods, like the 
additive AHP methods and the ELECTRE II and III methods, may cause some types of 
rank reversal problems. Rank reversal means that the ranking between two alternatives 
might be reversed after some variation occurs to the decision problem, like adding a new 
alternative, dropping an old alternative or replacing a non-optimal alternative by a worse 
one etc. Usually such a rank reversal is undesirable for decision-making problems. If a 
method does allow it to happen, the validity of the method could be questioned. However, 
some recent studies indicate that rank reversals could also happen because of people’s 
rational preference reversal which may be caused by their emotional feelings, like regret 
and rejoicing.  
Since regret and rejoicing may play a pivotal role in evaluating alternatives in 
MCDM problems, sometimes the decision maker (DM) may want to anticipate these 
emotional feelings and consider them in the decision-making process. Most of the regret 
models in the literature use continuous functions to measure this emotional factor. This 
dissertation proposes to use an approach based on a linguistic scale and pairwise 
comparisons to measure a DM’s anticipated regret and rejoicing feelings. The approach is 
shown to exhibit some key advantages over existing approaches. Next a multiplicative 
MCDM model is adopted to aggregate the alternatives’ associated regret and rejoicing 
values with their performance values to get their final priorities and then rank them. A 
 vi
simulated numerical example is used to illustrate the process of the proposed method. 
Some sensitivity analyses which aim at examining how changes of regret and rejoicing 
values might affect the ranking results of the decision problems are also developed. Then 
a fuzzy version of the new method is introduced and illustrated by a numerical example. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are made. Ranking intransitivity and some other issues 

































CHAPTER 1. PRELIMIARY PROBLEM DESCRIPTIO 
Making all kinds of decisions is an indispensable part of our lives. From the 
ancient times to the modern age, people never stopped their efforts in seeking ways for 
making more reliable and scientifically sound decisions. For those daily life decision 
problems, such as which shirt should one wear to match a given suit and so on, one may 
quickly decide it just by using his/her personal preferences, experiences, and/or instincts. 
However, in many fields of engineering, business, government, and sciences, where 
decisions may be worth millions or billions of dollars, or decisions may have a significant 
impact on the welfare of the society, decision-making problems are usually too complex 
and anything but as simple as the above one.  
For instance, many large companies and organizations face the problem of 
prioritizing a set of competing projects. Each one of these projects may have some 
short-term and long-term potential profits, costs and some negative or positive side 
effects. At the same time, there is a limited budget to be distributed among these projects. 
Some of the projects may not get funded at all. Besides these projects, the decision 
makers have also defined some criteria to be used to evaluate these projects. When faced 
with such decision-making problems, no single decision maker (DM) or group of 
decision makers can systematically consider all the available information simultaneously 
and reach the right decisions by just using their experiences or personal instincts. For 
such cases people need to use valid decision analysis approaches and tools in analyzing 
all the issues involved and eventually reaching the optimal decisions. They also need to 
do so in a way that can be easily and objectively explained to others and be defended to a 
wide audience of stakeholders. This is how and why the field of decision sciences has 
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emerged as an important scientific discipline in today’s world. 
In the past few decades, numerous decision-making methods and decision aid 
software packages have been proposed in the literature and are used in various areas.  
Among them, a class of methods known as multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is 
one of the most widely used decision-making methodologies in the sciences, business, 
and engineering worlds. MCDM methods aim at improving the quality of decisions by 
making the decision-making process more explicit, rational, and efficient. Some 
applications of MCDM include the use in civil and environmental engineering 
[Zavadskas, et al., 2004; Hobbs and Meier, 2000], in financial engineering [Zopounidis 
and Doumpos, 2000], in water resources planning [Raj, 1995], in waste water or solid 
waste management [Rogers and Bruen, 1999; Hokkanen and Salminen, 1997], and in 
credit risk assessment [Doumpos, et al., 2002]. 
Although MCDM has attracted the interest of researchers and practitioners for 
many years in a wide spectrum of areas, it is far from being mature and there are still a lot 
of unresolved issues. One intriguing problem is that oftentimes different methods may 
yield different answers when they are fed with exactly the same decision problem and 
data. Thus, the issue of evaluating the relative performance of different MCDM methods 
is naturally raised. This, in turn, raises the question of how one can evaluate them. Since 
it is practically impossible to know which one is the best alternative for a given decision 
problem, some kind of testing procedures need to be determined. One such procedure is 
to examine the validity of an MCDM method’s mathematical process by checking the 
stability and validity of its proposed rankings. 
The above subjects, along with some other related issues, have been studied by 
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many researchers in the MCDM area [Troutt, 1988; Buchanan, 1994]. In [Triantaphyllou, 
2000] some test criteria for checking whether some kinds of ranking irregularities may 
happen with some MCDM methods were established to examine the relative performance 
of those methods. By using these test criteria, it was found that two well-known MCDM 
methods, the original AHP method and the revised AHP method both allow for some 
types of rank reversals to happen (the first case of rank reversal identified with the 
original AHP method was reported in [Belton and Gear, 1983]). Recently, two ELECTRE 
methods – ELECTRE II and III, were also found to suffer of similar rank reversal 
problems as the additive AHP methods as discussed in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2006] 
and [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008]. Rank reversal means that the ranking between two 
alternatives might be reversed after some variation occurs to the decision problem, like 
adding a new alternative, dropping an old alternative or replacing an old alternative by a 
worse one etc. For example, two alternatives A1 and A2 may be initially ranked as A1 f  
A2 (i.e., A1 is more preferable than A2). After a new alternative A3 is introduced into the 
decision problem and the alternatives are ranked again by using the same method, the 
ranking between A1 and A2 may be reversed and become A2 f  A1. Usually, such a rank 
reversal is undesirable. If a method does allow it to happen, the validity of the method 
could be questioned. 
However, some studies have shown that it is not always unreasonable to have 
such rank reversals happening in MCDM problems. The critical question is to be able to 
distinguish why they happen. When a method exhibits rank reversals, is it because it 
accurately captured the way rational humans deal with decision-making and their 
preferences change or is it because the method has some kind of numerical 
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instabilities/mathematical defects? Let us put it more clearly through a metaphor: suppose 
a method is like a photo camera or X-ray image taking device. One takes a photo or takes 
an X-ray image of a subject and sees something strange in that image, like some very 
bright spots. Do these bright spots exist in reality or are purely the result of some kind of 
hardware defects? 
For different MCDM methods and decision models, the answer to the above 
question could be very different. Some past research [Belton and Gear, 1983; Dyer, 
1990a and 1990b; Triantaphyllou, 2000; Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] has shown that 
the rank reversal problems with the additive AHP and ELECTRE II and III methods are 
mainly due to these methods’ own mathematical artifacts. However, rank reversals could 
also happen because people’s rational preferences may change by their emotional feelings. 
Here is one such hypothetical example: suppose one is planning to buy a new car and a 
dealer offers two cars, say cars A and B. In this hypothetical scenario car A is cheaper 
than car B but car B is of better quality than car A. Then, one may decide to buy car A 
because it is cheaper. Next, suppose that besides the above two cars, the dealer introduces 
a third car C (let us call it a phantom alternative) which may not even be at stock at that 
dealership but it has been publicized by the media. This third car C is much more 
expensive than the previous two cars but it is of slightly better quality than car B. 
Knowing this situation about the third car, the perspective buyer may shift his/her 
preference and now choose car B instead of car A without actually changing anything 
regarding the two initial cars and the importance of the two evaluative criteria: cost and 
quality. When comparing car B with car C, the buyer feels very happy for getting a great 
deal by paying much less money to buy an almost equal quality car B. Thus for this 
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example, it is this anticipated rejoicing feeling that makes one unintentionally to reverse 
his/her preference between cars A and B.   
Except rejoicing, another type of emotional feeling which can greatly influence 
people’s preference in decision-making is regret. This type of emotional feeling comes 
from the fact that humans often base their choices on comparisons across the alternatives 
under consideration and relative to “what might have been” under another choice [Plous, 
1993; Hastie and Dawes, 2001]. For example, suppose given are two alternatives A1 and 
A2 which have been evaluated in terms of three criteria. Assume that by using some 
MCDM method, the overall performance value of A1 is better than that of A2 but the 
individual performance value a1k of alternative A1 under criterion Ck is worse than that of 
alternative A2 under the same criterion (denoted as a2k). Then the decision maker who 
chooses A1 and forgoes A2 may experience a certain level of regret because the value a1k 
is worse than a2k. This regret feeling could be so strong that he/she may regret to have 
chosen A1 instead of A2. In order to avoid the above situation, sometimes the DM would 
want to anticipate the regret feeling and consider it in the decision-making process by 
making some tradeoffs for a more balanced alternative.  
From the above examples, it can be seen that making a choice/decision, no matter 
what kind of, can be an intensive emotional experience. When making decisions, except 
those cognitive considerations about the decision problems themselves, sometimes people 
also need to consider some intense emotional factors, like regret and rejoicing. 
Psychologically speaking humans often behave based on a combination of reasons and 
emotions. It is natural that decisions should be made by the mind and also by the heart 
instead of by a complete rational mind which is dissociated from psychological feelings.  
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Studies on the notion of regret and rejoicing for decision-making under uncertainty 
have been carried out for over fifty years. However, it is just in recent years that these 
emotional factors began to be introduced in deterministic MCDM problems. Though 
there are some tentative works on this direction [Kujawski, 2005; Kaliszewski and 
Michalowski, 1998], more studies are needed to assess the impact that these emotional 
factors might bring to the MCDM problems and the role that they may play in evaluating 
alternatives. Meanwhile, an advanced model which can incorporate the notion of regret 
and rejoicing systematically in the MCDM modeling framework for conflicting decision 
criteria needs to be developed. These are the research subjects of this dissertation.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter presents a literature 
review on MCDM and some studies on rank reversals with the additive AHP methods 
and the ELECTRE II and III methods. The third chapter describes how regret and 
rejoicing are considered in the decision-making process and some regret models from the 
literature. The fourth chapter is the most intriguing one as it proposes to use a linguistic 
scale to measure regret and rejoicing and determine the alternatives’ associated regret and 
rejoicing values by developing some regret/rejoicing matrices based on pairwise 
comparisons. In the fifth chapter, a multiplicative MCDM model is extended to combine 
the alternatives’ associated regret and rejoicing values with their performance values in 
order to eventually determine their final priorities. The case of having intransitive 
rankings and some other issues about the new method are also discussed. In the sixth 
section, a numerical example is used to illustrate the process of the proposed new method. 
Then, some sensitivity analyses which aim at examining how changes of regret and 
rejoicing might affect the ranking results of the decision problems are developed. In the 
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seventh chapter, a fuzzy version of the new method is introduced and illustrated by a 
numerical example. In the last chapter, some concluding remarks are made on the main 
contributions in this dissertation and the meaning of those contributions. Finally, some 




































CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW O MCDM   
2.1 An Introduction to MCDM 
A typical MCDM problem is concerned with the task of ranking a finite number 
of decision alternatives, each of which is explicitly described in terms of different 
characteristics (also often called attributes, decision criteria, or objectives) which have to 
be taken into account simultaneously (as in the previously mentioned project 
prioritization problem). Decision criteria may be quantitative (such as cost, age, weight, 
volume, etc) or qualitative (such as desirability, aesthetic appeal, style, etc). They can 
also be cost criteria (the lower the score is, the more preferable it is) or benefit criteria 
(the higher the score is, the more preferable it is). Different decision criteria may be 
associated with different units of measure. To combine them together, the criteria values 
may need to be normalized. Otherwise, combining them is equivalent to “adding apples 
and oranges”. Usually, the alternatives’ performance values under the decision criteria 
and the criteria weights are viewed as the entries of a decision matrix defined as in Figure 
1. The aij element of the decision matrix represents the performance value of the i-th 
alternative in terms of the j-th criterion. The parameter wj represents the weight of the j-th 
criterion. Data for MCDM problems can be determined by direct observation (if they are 
easily quantifiable) or by indirect means if they are qualitative [Triantaphyllou et al., 
1994]. 
 Another term that is also used frequently to mean the same type of decision 
models is multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). There is a subtle difference between 
these two terms. The term MCDM is often used to mean finding the best alternative in 
continuous decision spaces. However, in the setting of MCDA, the alternatives are not 
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known a priori but they can be determined by calculating the values of a number of 
discrete and/or continuous variables. Usually, an MCDA method aims at one of the 
following four goals, or “problematics” [Roy, 1985], [Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos, 2001]: 
Problematic 1: Find the best alternative. 
Problematic 2: Group the alternatives into well-defined classes. 
Problematic 3: Rank the alternatives in order of total preference. 
Problematic 4: Describe how well each alternative meets all the criteria 
simultaneously. 
Many interesting aspects of MCDA theory and practice are discussed in [Hobbs, 1986], 
[Hobbs, et al., 1992], [Stewart, 1992], [Triantaphyllou, 2000], [Zanakis, et al., 1995], and 
[Zanakis, et al., 1998]. The terms MCDM and MCDA may also be used to denote the 
same class of models.  
         C r i t e r i a  
        C1          C2      ... Cn   
        (w1     w2      ... wn) 
     Alternatives ________________________  
      A1  a11    a12      ...   a1n  
      A2  a21    a22     ... a2n 
        .   .   .  .  . 
        .   .   .  .  . 
        .   .   .  .  . 
      Am  am1    am2     ... amn   
Figure 1. Structure of a typical decision matrix. 
From the early developments of the MCDM theories in the 1950s and 1960s, a 
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plethora of MCDM methods have been developed in the literature and new contributions 
are continuously coming forth in this area. There are also many ways to classify the 
existing MCDM methods. One of the ways is to classify MCDM methods according to 
the type of data they use. Thus, there are deterministic, stochastic, and fuzzy MCDM 
methods [Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Another way of classifying MCDM methods is 
according to the number of the decision makers involved in the decision process. Hence, 
there are single decision maker MCDM methods and group decision-making MCDM. For 
some representative articles in this area, see [George, et al., 1992], [Hackman and Kaplan, 
1974], and [DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987]. In this dissertation, the research concentrates 
on single decision maker deterministic MCDM problems which attempt to find the best 
alternative subject to a finite number of decision criteria.   
2.2 Some Well-known MCDM Methods 
Among the numerous MCDM methods, there are several prominent families that 
have enjoyed a wide acceptance in the academic area and many real-world applications. 
Each of these methods has its own characteristics and background logic. Next is a brief 
description of some of them.  
2.2.1 The Analytic Hierarchy Process and Some of Its Variants 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (or AHP) method was developed by Professor 
Thomas Saaty [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; and Saaty and Vargas, 2000]. This 
decision-making method can help people set priorities and choose the best options by 
reducing complex decision problems to a system of hierarchies. Since its inception, it has 
evolved into several different variants and has been widely used to solve a broad range of 
multi-criteria decision problems [Vaidya and Kumar, 2006].   
 11
2.2.1.1 The Original Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The AHP method uses the pairwise comparisons and eigenvector methods to 
determine the aij values and also the criteria weights wj. The details about the pairwise 
comparisons and the eigenvector methods can be found in [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; and 
Saaty and Vargas, 2000]. In this method, aij represents the relative performance value of 
alternative Ai when it is considered in terms of criterion Cj. In the original AHP method, 
the aij values of the decision matrix need to be normalized vertically. That is, the elements 
of each column in the decision matrix add up to one. In this way, values with various 
units of measurement can be transformed into dimensionless ones. If all the criteria are 
benefit criteria, then according to the original AHP method, the best alternative is the one 
that satisfies the following expression:  




AHP i ij j
i i
j
P P a w
=
= = ∑ ,   for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.          (2-1) 
From the above formula, we can see that the original AHP method uses an additive 
expression to determine the final priorities of the. Next the revised AHP is introduced, 
which is also an additive variant of the original AHP method. 
2.2.1.2 The Revised Analytic Hierarchy Process  
The revised AHP model was proposed by Belton and Gear in [1983] after they 
first found a case of rank reversal that occurred when the original AHP method was used. 
In their case, the original AHP method was used to rank three alternatives in a simple test 
problem. Then a fourth alternative, identical to one of the three alternatives, was 
introduced in the original decision problem without changing any other data. The ranking 
of the original three alternatives was changed after the revised problem was ranked again 
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by the same method. The following is this rank reversal example from [Belton and Gear, 
1983].  
Suppose the decision matrix of a decision problem with three alternatives and 
three criteria is as follows:  
      C r i t e r i a 
 C1        C2     C3 
  ( 1/3     1/3    1/3 ) 
Alts.     ___________________ 
A1    1    9    8 
A2      9    1    9 
A3      1    1      1 
By using the original AHP method, the above decision matrix is normalized first 
by the column totals to get the relative data as follows: 
        C r i t e r i a 
 C1         C2      C3 
  ( 1/3     1/3     1/3 ) 
Alts.     ___________________ 
 A1    1/11   9/11   8/18 
 A2      9/11   1/11   9/18 
 A3      1/11   1/11   1/18 
Then, it can be shown that the final AHP scores of the three alternatives are: (0.45, 
0.47, 0.08). That is, A2 f  A1 f  A3. Next, a new alternative A4 which is identical to the 
existing alternative A2 is added to the decision matrix. Now the normalized decision 
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matrix is as follows: 
       C r i t e r i a 
  C1         C2     C3 
  ( 1/3     1/3    1/3 ) 
Alts.     ___________________ 
 A1      1/20   9/12   8/27 
 A2      9/20   1/12   9/27 
 A3      1/20   1/12   1/27 
 A4      9/20   1/12   9/27 
By using the same AHP method, now the final AHP scores of these alternatives are: (0.37, 
0.29, 0.06, 0.29). That is, the four alternatives are ranked as A1 f  A2 = A4 f  A3.  This 
result contradicts the previous one in which A2 f  A1.  
According to Belton and Gear the root for this inconsistency is the fact that the 
relative values of the alternatives for each criterion sum up to one. So instead of having 
the relative values of the alternatives sum up to one, they proposed to divide each relative 
performance value by the maximum of the relative values. According to this variant, the 
aij values of the decision matrix need to be normalized by dividing the elements of each 
column in the decision matrix by the largest value in that column. As before, the best 
alternative is given again by the additive formula (2-1), but now the normalization is 
different. 




Revised AHP i ij j
i i
j
P P a w−
=
= = ∑ ,   for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.        (2-2) 
The revised AHP was sharply criticized by Saaty in [1990]. After many debates and a 
heated discussion (e.g., [Dyer, 1990a; and 1990b], [Saaty, 1983; 1987; and 1990], and 
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[Harker and Vargas, 1990]), Saaty accepted this variant and now it is also called the ideal 
mode AHP [Saaty, 1994].  
However, the revised AHP method was found to suffer of some other ranking 
problems even without the introduction of identical alternatives [Triantaphyllou and 
Mann, 1989; Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Most of the problematic situations of the additive 
AHP methods can be attributed to the required normalization (either by dividing by the 
sum of the elements or by the maximum value in a vector) and also the use of an additive 
formula on the data of the decision matrix for deriving the final preference values of the 
alternatives.  
In the core step of one of the MCDM methods known as the Weighted Product 
Model (WPM) [Bridgeman, 1922; Miller and Starr, 1969], the use of an additive formula 
is avoided by using a multiplicative expression. This brought the development of a 
multiplicative version of the AHP method, known as the multiplicative AHP.    
2.2.1.3 The Multiplicative Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The use of multiplicative formulas in deriving the relative priorities in 
decision-making is not new [Lootsma, 1991]. A critical development appears to be the 
use of multiplicative formulations when one aggregates the performance values aij with 
the criteria weights wj. In the WPM method, each alternative is compared with others in 
terms of the product of a number of ratios, one for each criterion. Each ratio is raised to 
the power of the relative weight of the corresponding criterion. In general, the following 
formula is used ([Bridgeman, 1922; Miller and Starr, 1969]) in order to compare two 
alternatives AK and AL:  
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=        
∏                      (2-3) 
If R(AK / AL) >  1, then AK is more desirable than AL (for the maximization case). Then 
the best alternative is the one that is better than or at least equal to all other alternatives.   
Based on the WPM method, Barzilai and Lootsma in [1994] and Lootsma in 
[1999] proposed the multiplicative version of the AHP method. According to this method, 
the performance values aij and criteria weights wj are not processed according to formula 
(2-1), but the WPM formula (2-3) is used instead. Furthermore, one can use a variant of 
formula (2-3) to compute preference values of the alternatives that in turn, can be used to 
rank them. The preference values can be computed as follows: 
                         ( ),
1
jwn




= ∏                       (2-4) 
Please note that if Pi > Pj, then Pi / Pj > 1, or equivalently, Pi – Pj > 0. That is, two 
alternatives Ai and Aj can be compared in terms of their preference values Pi and Pj by 
forming the ratios or, equivalently, the differences of their preference values. 
By using the multiplicative formula, no matter how the decision matrix is 
normalized, the ratios of the alternatives’ performance values are kept the same because 
the normalization factor is cancelled off in the multiplicative formula. Thus most of the 
ranking irregularities which occur to the additive AHP methods will not happen with the 
multiplicative AHP method. These properties of the multiplicative AHP method have 
been demonstrated theoretically in [Triantaphyllou, 2000]. 
2.2.2 The ELECTRE Methods 
Another prominent role in MCDM methods is played by the ELECTRE approach 
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and its derivatives. The acronym ELECTRE stands for: ELimination Et Choix Traduisant 
la REalité (ELimination and Choice Expressing REality) [Roy, 1985]. This approach was 
first introduced in [Benayoun, et al., 1966]. The main idea of this method is the proper 
utilization of what is called “outranking relations” to rank a set of alternatives. The 
ELECTRE approach uses the data of the decision problems along with some additional 
threshold values set by the decision makers to measure the degree to which each 
alternative outranks all others. Soon after the introduction of the first version known as 
ELECTRE I [Roy, 1968], this approach has evolved into a number of other variants. 
Among those variants, the ELECTRE II [Roy and Bertier, 1971, 1973] and the 
ELECTRE III [Roy, 1978] methods have been widely accepted in solving MCDM 
problems in the engineering world, like civil and environmental engineering [Hobbs and 
Meier, 2000].   
For most ELECTRE methods, there are two main stages: the construction of the 
outranking relations and the exploitation of these relations to get the final ranking of the 
alternatives. Different ELECTRE methods may differ in how they define the outranking 
relations between the alternatives and how they apply these relations to get the final 
ranking of the alternatives. The construction of the outranking relations is based on the 
evaluation of two indices, the concordance index and the discordance index, defined for 
each pair of alternatives. The concordance index for a pair of alternatives a and b 
measures the strength of the hypothesis that alternative a is at least as good as alternative 
b. The discordance index measures the strength of evidence against this hypothesis 
[Belton and Stewart, 2001]. There are no unique measures of concordance and 
discordance indices. Since the ELECTRE approach is more complicated than the AHP 
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approach, the process of ELECTRE II is described next for a simple introduction of its 
logic. 
In ELECTRE II, the concordance index C(a, b) for each pair of alternatives (a, b) 
















Where Q (a, b) is the set of criteria for which alternative a is equal or preferred to (i.e., at 
least as good as) alternative b and wi is the weight of the i-th criterion. One can see that 
the concordance index is the proportion of the criteria weights allocated to those criteria 
for which a is equal or preferred to b. The discordance index D (a, b) for each pair (a, b) 
is defined as follows: 
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Where ( )ig a  and ( )ig b  represent the performance values of alternatives a and b in 
terms of criterion Ci and max | ( ) ( ) |i i
i
g b g aδ = −  (i.e., the maximum difference on any 
criterion). This formula can only be used when the scores for different criteria are 
comparable. After computing the concordance and discordance indices for each pair of 
alternatives, two outranking relations are built between the alternatives by comparing the 
indices with two pairs of threshold values. They are referred to as the strong and weak 
outranking relations. 








) are defined as the concordance 









.  Then the outranking relations will be built based on the following rules:  
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(1) If C(a, b) ≥ C*, D(a, b) ≤ D* and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is regarded as 
“strongly outranking” alternative b.   
(2) If C(a, b) ≥ C —, D(a, b) ≤ D— and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is regarded 
as “weakly outranking” alternative b.   
The values of (C*, D*) and (C —, D—) are decided by the decision maker for a particular 
outranking relation. These threshold values may be varied to give more or less severe 
outranking relations; the higher the value of C
*
and the lower the value of D
*
, the more 
severe (i.e., stronger) the outranking relation is. That is, the more difficult it is for one 
alternative to outrank another one [Belton and Stewart, 2001]. After establishing the 
strong and weak outranking relations between the alternatives, the descending and 
ascending distillation processes are applied to the outranking relations to get two 
pre-orders of the alternatives. Next by combining the two pre-orders together, the overall 
ranking of the alternatives is determined. For a detailed description of the distillation 
processes, please refer to [Belton and Stewart, 2001] and [Rogers, et al., 1999].  
Compared with the simple process and precise data requirement of the AHP 
methods, ELECTRE methods apply some more complicated algorithms to deal with 
complex and imprecise information from the decision problems and rank the alternatives. 
The ELECTRE algorithms look reliable and in neat format. People believe that the 
process of this approach could lead to an explicit and logical ranking of the alternatives. 
However this is not always the case. In [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], it was found 
that the ELECTRE II and III methods may cause some of the same ranking irregularity 
problems as the additive AHP methods because of its own mathematical artifacts.  
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2.2.3 Rank Reversals with the Additive AHP and the ELECTRE II and III Methods 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.2, the revised AHP method was found to suffer of 
some other ranking problems even without the introduction of identical alternatives. 
Besides the rank reversal case found by Belton and Gear in [1983], some other types of 
ranking irregularities which happened with the additive AHP methods were reported in 
[Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1989; Triantaphyllou, 2000]. In one type of test, a decision 
problem is decomposed into a set of smaller problems, each defined on two alternatives 
at a time and the same number of criteria as in the original problem. The alternatives are 
ranked two at a time and also all of them simultaneously. Then, the ranking of the 
alternatives from the smaller problems may not follow the transitivity property or the 
combined ranking from the smaller problems may not be the same as the ranking deduced 
from the original un-decomposed problem. The reason is that the normalization factor 
might be different when alternatives are ranked two at a time or ranked all together. After 
the computations of the weighted sums, the overall performance values of the alternatives 
might also be different and that could alter their rankings. Another type of irregular 
ranking problem is that the indication of the optimal alternative may change when one of 
the non-optimal alternatives is replaced by a worse one (given that the other date of the 
decision problem remains unchanged). As discussed before, most of the problematic 
situations of the additive AHP methods can be attributed to their own mathematical 
artifacts.  
Although research on the issue of rank reversals happened with the additive AHP 
methods has been carried out for more than thirty years, it is still a topic full of 
controversies. The AHP method has been widely used in many real-life decision 
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problems. Thousands of AHP applications have been reported in edited volumes and 
books (e.g., Golden, et al., 1989, Saaty and Vargas, 2000) and on websites (e.g., 
www.expertchoice.com). However, the issue of ranking irregularities has not been fully 
known by regular users of these methods. ExpertChoice is popular decision support 
software which is based on the algorithm of the AHP method. Recently (i.e., in July of 
2008), in an article from Blue Cross Blue Shield in Florida, the author said that Expert 
Choice helped them make decisions in an efficient way and avoid delays and 
manipulations by few DMs (http://extranet.expertchoice.com/public/ 
Newsletter_July08.pdf). By using such kind of appealing software packages with friendly 
interface, the users usually are very confident that the software can lead them to the 
"right" decisions even though they may not be right scientifically. However, if the DMs 
know more about issues such as the problems related to irregular rankings which exist 
behind the used methods, they may have a more comprehensive and deeper 
understanding about the recommended ranking results from such software packages. 
Thus, it is imperative to bring to people’s attention the analysis of the validity of 
MCDM/MCDA methods and the related issue of ranking irregularities.   
For the same goal as above, in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], the ELECTRE II 
and III methods were studied in detail for the validity of their proposed rankings. It was 
found that these two methods might cause some of the same ranking irregularity 
problems as the additive AHP methods because of their own mathematical artifacts. One 
is that the indication of the optimal alternative may change when one of the non-optimal 
alternatives is replaced by a worse one. Another one is that the ranking of the alternatives 
may not follow the transitivity property when they are compared two at a time. The last 
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problem is that the ranking of the alternatives may be different when they are compared 
two at a time and also simultaneously. According to some computational experiments and 
real-life case studies in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], for the ELECTRE II and III 
methods, the rates of these types of ranking irregularities were rather significant 
(sometimes approaching 100%) in both the simulated decision problems and the studied 
real-life cases.   
By analyzing the ranking processes of the ELECTRE II and III methods and some 
rank reversal cases which occurred when these methods were used, it was found that the 
main reason for the above rank reversals lies in the exploitation of the pairwise 
outranking relations [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] which are the distillation processes 
of the ELECTRE II and III methods. The basic idea behind the distillation processes is to 
decide the rank of each alternative by the degree of how this alternative outranks all the 
other alternatives. Thus, the ranking of a specific alternative derived by these two 
methods depends on the performance of all the other alternatives currently under 
consideration and also the set of alternatives being compared. This causes the ranking of 
the alternatives to depend on each other and leads to the occurrence of the above 
mentioned ranking irregularities. For instance, when a non-optimal alternative is replaced 
by a worse one, the pairwise outranking relations related to it may be changed 
accordingly. Then the overall ranking of the entire alternative set, which depends on those 
pairwise outranking relations, may also be changed. The first change is reasonable when 
considering the fact that a non-optimal alternative has been replaced by a worse one. 
However, the second change may alter the indication of the best ranked alternatives, 
which is unreasonable and undesirable.  
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The publication of [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], which is the paper titled as 
“Ranking Irregularities When Evaluating Alternatives by Using Some ELECTRE 
Methods”, has stimulated some deeper discussions with others on the issue of rank 
reversals and how should researchers in this area evaluate the performance of different 
MCDM methods. Because of its significant potential to the decision-making problems 
related to civil and environmental engineering, the research in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 
2008] was funded by an Environmental Education 2003-2004 Award which was 
sponsored by the Office of Environmental Education, Office of the Governor, State of 
Louisiana. 
2.2.4 Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
Multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) is another type of systematic method for 
identifying and analyzing various alternatives and factors in order to arrive at a rational 
decision [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Kirkwood, 1997]. This approach transfers the 
performance value of an alternative under each decision criterion into a utility value 
according to some utility function for that criterion. The utility is a numerical value 
between 0 and 1 and it represents the preferability of the alternative under that decision 
criterion. Considering the weight of each criterion, the utility of each alternative under 
each criterion is multiplied by the weight of that criterion. The total utility of each 
alternative can be calculated by summing up the weighted utility values under all the 
decision criteria. Then the alternatives are ranked in terms of their total utilities. 
One of the key assumptions behind the above utility model is that the DMs are 
“Rational Individuals” which are devoid of psychological influences or emotions [Luce, 
1992]. Under this assumption, it is expected that DMs will always want to make choices 
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that can maximize the utilities of the chosen alternatives and the utilities of the 
alternatives are independent of each other. However, behavioral scientists have 
demonstrated that it is not always appropriate to relate decision rationality to utility 
maximization. Examples demonstrating systematic violations of the utility maximization 






























CHAPTER 3. STUDIES O REGRET 
Similar assumptions of a completely rational mind and utility maximization are 
also behind most of the MCDM methods which do not consider emotional feelings at all 
and always determine the alternatives with maximum overall performance values as the 
optimal solutions. In order to broaden the assumptions of classical utility theory, some 
alternative approaches have been proposed. In [Wierzbicki, 1980], an aspiration-based 
method which was developed according to Hebert Simon’s bounded rationality principle 
[Simon, 1956] was proposed. Instead of identifying decisions with the maximum utility, 
this method helps a DM to identity prospective decisions which satisfy his/her preference 
expressed through setting scalarizing parameters for a so-called scalarizing function. In 
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], a new theory, called Prospect Theory, was developed. 
According to this theory, a DM must “edit” prospects (attributes of decisions) before 
selecting a decision in order to account for his/her risk attitude (risk seeking or risk 
averse). 
Another direction of research is to incorporate behavioral issues into the analysis 
of decision-making problems, for example, strong emotional feelings like regret and 
rejoicing. These two emotional factors were first studied for decision-making under 
uncertainty. In [Sugden, 1985] regret was defined as “the painful sensation of recognizing 
that ‘what is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’”. The converse 
experience of a favorable comparison between the two is called “rejoicing”. Some 
experimental studies confirm that for most individuals regret has the greater impact 
[Mellers, 2000]. In related research studies, regret is also the one that has received most 
of the attention.  
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3.1 Some Regret Models 
One of the earliest regret models is known as the minimax regret model which 
was introduced by Savage [1951] and was first axiomatized by Milnor [1954]. This 
model defines regret as the difference between the actual performance value of each 
decision alternative and the best possible value among all alternatives for each state of 
nature. Suppose the utility value of an alternative Ai under a state of nature Sk is uik. Then, 
the decision maker who chooses Ai will experience a level of regret Rik for the state of 
nature Sk where Rik is defined as follows: 
max( )ik jk ik
j
R u u= − .  
The DM would first determine the possible highest level of regret that could occur to 
each decision alternative, and then choose the alternative with the minimum of these 
maximum regret values [Zeelenberg, 1999]. Because this model decides the selection of 
alternatives totally by their regret values, it may lead to irrational choices. Such as a small 
disadvantage in a single decision criterion, no matter how large/small its importance is, 
may eliminate alternatives with more preferable performance values under more 
important criteria [Kujawski, 2005]. Given this undesirable property, the minimax regret 
model has not been used widely.  
Later, Loomes and Sugden and also Bell proposed a regret theory (referred to as 
the RT-B/LS regret theory) simultaneously in 1982 for rational decision-making under 
uncertainty [Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982 and 1985]. In the RT-B/LS model, 
regret is defined as the psychological reaction that is caused by comparing an outcome 
under one state with the payoff one could have had by making a different choice under 
the same state. Except the notions of regret and its counterpart rejoicing, the RT-B/LS 
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model also considers disappointment and its counterpart elation. Disappointment and 
elation depend on the risk and opportunity of the selected action under a state of 
uncertainty [Browning and Hillson, 2004]. A rational individual feels some level of 
disappointment in decision-making under uncertainty when the outcome does not match 
up to expectations, and he/she experiences elation when the outcome exceeds expectation 
[Bell, 1985]. Anticipated disappointment and elation are not considerations or influences 
for deterministic choices. In contrast, a rational individual may experience regret and 
rejoicing when making decisions under certainty as well as uncertainty [Kujawski, 2005]. 
Since the research in this dissertation focuses on deterministic MCDM problems, 
disappointment and elation will not be considered. 
The RT-B/LS model assumes that the levels of regret and rejoicing depend on the 
difference of the utilities between what is and what could have been. For example, the 
associated level of regret when comparing the utility value uik with the utility value ujk is 




jk ik ik jk
ik jk
R u u if u u
R u u
otherwise
−       <   
= 
                 
 
Where iku is the classical utility of the i-th alternative in terms of the k-th criterion, and 
R(.) is a non-decreasing regret function which is further assumed to be convex [Kujawski, 
2005].  
In [Kujawski, 2005], a regret model called the Reference-Dependent Regret 
Model (RDRM) was proposed for deterministic decision-making. Kujawski argued that, 
in general, a person’s level of regret when he/she chooses a multi-attribute alternative 
often depends explicitly on the absolute values of the utilities of the chosen and forgone 
alternatives (i.e., alternatives that were considered but not chosen) rather than simply 
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their differences. Thus, in his RDRM model, the anticipated regret when choosing uik and 
forgoing ujk is defined as follows: 
(1 ) (1 ),
( , )
0, .
ik jk ik jk
ik jk
G u G u if u u
R u u
otherwise
− − −      <   
=     
                 
 
Where G(.) is the regret-building function which measures the level of regret referenced 
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The two parameters B and S in the definition of G(.) are determined by querying the 
decision maker about the levels of regret that he/she experiences under each criterion 
[Kujawski, 2005]. The RDRM model defines the total level of regret for choosing Ai from 
a set S of n (where n ≥ 2) alternatives with m criteria as follows: 
                        
1 1
1




i k ik jk
k j
R w R u u
n = =
=
− ∑ ∑ .                  (3-1) 
The final utility of alternative Ai given the set S is defined as follows:  
         1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( , )
1
m m m n
s S
i k ik i k ik k ik lk
k k k l
U w u R w u w R u u
n= = = =
= − = −
−∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ .           (3-2) 
In the above formula, the first term is the classical utility of alternative Ai and the second 
term is the anticipated regret for choosing alternative Ai and forgoing all the other 
alternatives. Finally, the alternatives are ranked by their final utilities.  
Among the previous regret models, the minimax and the RT-B/LS regret models 
were originally developed for decision-making under uncertainty. However, both of them 
can be tailored to be used in deterministic decision-making problems by identifying the 
states of nature with the criteria of a given MCDM problem. For instance, the notion of 
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regret in the RDRM model is defined by tailoring Bell’s [1982] notion of anticipated 
regret for decision-making under uncertainty. In [Kaliszewski and Michalowski, 1998] it 
was also mentioned that the notion of regret becomes meaningful in deterministic 
multi-criteria decision problems if the notion of state is equated to the notion of attribute, 
and a state/attribute matrix conveys regret type of information (for example, the 
difference between ideal and actual values of the attributes).  
It needs to be noted that the effect of the anticipated regret/rejoicing is different 
from the experienced emotions. In deterministic decision-making situations, decision 
makers do not have to experience the emotions in order to be influenced by them. Rather, 
they can predict the emotional consequences of different decision outcomes in advance, 
and opt for the choices that minimize the possibility of negative emotions [Zeelenberg et 
al., 2000]. As stated in [Kujawski, 2005], in the process of choosing a deterministic 
alternative, a rational individual may decide to trade off some benefits and forgo the 
alternative with the highest total value for a more balanced alternative in order to reduce 
his/her level of anticipated regret. 
From the previous discussions it is clear that regret theory is based on two 
fundamental assumptions: (1) people experience the sensations of regret and rejoicing 
which can influence their current decision-making; and (2) when making decisions 
people try to anticipate and take into account feelings like regret and rejoicing [Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982; Kaliszewski and Michalowski, 1998]. Therefore, building an MCDM 
model that incorporates these emotional factors not only can provide a better description 
of human behavior in decision-making, but also offers the DMs the flexibility to trade off 
some economic benefits explicitly in order to gain a state of psychological satisfaction, 
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for prescriptive purposes [Bell, 1985].   
3.2 An Alternative Way for Measuring Regret  
In [Kujawski, 2005] it was asserted that the RDRM model satisfies three 
properties. The first property, referred to as the “independence of dominated alternatives” 
(IDA), seems to be an intuitive one. According to this property, given two alternatives Ai 
and Aj with Ai f  Aj the RDRM model preserves their ranking when a new alternative 
dominated by Ai is introduced or an old alternative dominated by Aj is dropped. However, 
as demonstrated in [Wang, Triantaphyllou, and Kujawski, 2008], the RDRM model may 
fail to satisfy this property. Next, a mathematical analysis why the RDRM model does 
not always follow the first property is described in detail. 
3.2.1 Mathematical Analysis of the RDRM Model 
Given a set S of n alternatives and m criteria, suppose that two alternatives, say 
alternatives Ai and Aj, are ranked as Ai f  Aj. As described by formula (3-2), the RDRM 
utility for alternative Ai and Aj are calculated as follows:  
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( , )
1
m m m n
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i k ik i k ik k ik lk
k k k l
U w u R w u w R u u
n= = = =
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Given that the two alternatives are ranked as fi jA A , we get 
                        0s si jU U− >                           (3-4) 
When introducing a new alternative Ak which is dominated by Ai, the value of iR ′  
remains unchanged while the value of jR
′  may increase if Ak dominates Aj in terms of 
one or more criteria. Thus, in formula (3-3), the part ( )i jR R
′ ′−  may become less than 
before. Meanwhile, the number of alternatives in the set S is increased by 1. Under the 
above possible changes, if the original value of ( )i jR R








 in formula (3-3) will become smaller than before. Then the inequality 
relation in (3-4) still holds. However, if the original value of ( )i jR R









 may become larger than before. Then the inequality relation in 
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(3-4) may be reversed and hence the ranking between Ai and Aj may be altered. This is 
how the RDRM model may fail to satisfy the property of independence of dominated 
alternatives.  
The implication of the above problem is that when the concepts of regret and 
rejoicing are considered and defined in terms of all the available alternatives in 
accordance to formula (3-1) of the RDRM model, the anticipated regret and rejoicing 
associated with an alternative will be influenced by the number of the considered 
alternatives (i.e., the cardinality of the considered set of alternatives) along with their 
performance values. Then adding or deleting a dominated alternative (also called 
non-Pareto optimal alternative) might affect these values and subsequently the ranking of 
the alternatives.  
3.2.2 An Alternative Way for Measuring Regret 
As mentioned in [Wang, Triantaphyllou, and Kujawski, 2008], Quiggin in [1994] 
described a similar problem where manipulation of the set of the alternatives may yield 
irrational choices as the ranking of the alternatives might be “money pumped.” That is, 
the ranking of the alternatives might be influenced by the introduction of dominated 
alternatives. In order to avoid being “money pumped”, Quiggin [1994] proposed that the 
measure of regret should satisfy a property called the Irrelevance of Statewise Dominated 
Alternatives (ISDA). This property is similar to the IDA property. In order to satisfy the 
ISDA property, Quiggin [1994] proved that regret must be determined solely by the best 
attainable outcome in each state of the world, or equivalently, the best performance value 
of each decision criterion in MCDM problems.   
This is in contrast with determining the regret associated with an alternative by 
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considering the entire set of alternatives, like averaging the regret contributions produced 
by comparing all available choice pairs. When Quiggin’s idea is applied to model regret 
in MCDM problems, the regret associated with an alternative is determined only by 
comparing the chosen criteria values with the best criteria values. Then addition or 
deletion of dominated alternatives cannot affect the regret levels of the other alternatives 
because the best criteria values are kept the same.  
However, the above idea may not make much sense as illustrated in the following 
hypothetical example. Suppose the scores of four students in some exam are according to 
the two scenarios as depicted in Tables 1 and 2:













In the first scenario there is just one student who earned a very high score. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the student who earned only 30 points (i.e., the 
very bottom grade) feels some but limited regret for not having achieved a higher score 
because his/her performance is not as bad when it is compared to that of most of the other 
students. However, in the second scenario, the same student may feel much stronger 
regret for scoring only 30 points because he/she is the only student who has a very low 
score.  
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If one considers the previous two scenarios with a larger number of students (say 
200 instead of 4), then the previous effects are much stronger. Therefore, intuitively in 
this example, it makes more sense to compute regret in terms of the entire set of 
alternatives. Thus, the concepts of regret and rejoicing may be more realistically 
expressed in terms of the criteria values of the entire set of alternatives than in terms of 
only the best criteria values. This is not the final suggestion. This point is further 
discussed in Section 4.3 where the influence of dominated alternatives is discussed. 
Please note that a paper on the research problems discussed in Section 3.2 has 
been written and is in print for publication in the journal of Systems Engineering. It is a 
product of Xiaoting Wang’s collaboration with Dr. Evangelos Triantaphyllou and Dr. 
Edouard Kujawski from the Naval Postgraduate School. For more detailed information 













CHAPTER 4. A EW WAY TO ASSESS THE ATICIPATED REGRET AD  
             REJOICIG 
From the descriptions in Section 2.1 it can be seen that a rather popular approach 
of measuring regret is to quantify regret by using some continuous functions. However, 
this approach may have some fundamental weaknesses.  
4.1 Limitations of Measuring Regret by Using Continuous Functions 
First of all, the definition of continuous regret functions may involve the 
determination of certain customizing parameters, such as the B and S parameters in the 
regret function G(.) of the RDRM model, as not all decision makers may behave in 
exactly the same way. Furthermore, it is not always clear how such parameters may be 
determined. It is also unclear whether such functions and their parameters should change 
from one criterion to another criterion within the same decision problem. 
Another concern is raised from the fact that emotional feelings like regret and 
rejoicing vary more in a discrete manner than in a continuous manner. They may not 
always increase continuously with the increase of the difference between two compared 
performance values. For example, usually people feel a certain level of regret when the 
difference is beyond an echelon value or when one of the two compared performance 
values is below a cut-off point while the other one is above the cut-off point. Furthermore, 
the level of regret may not only depend on the difference but also on the context in which 
the difference occurs. For instance, consider three students taking an exam. Two of them 
scored 79 and 70 points while another one 69 points. If the cut-off point to get the passing 
grade C is 70, or else the grade will be F (fails the exam), then it is quite possible that the 
second student (who has earned 70 points) may not have a strong regret feeling when 
 35
comparing his/her score with the first one though their scores are 9 points apart. However, 
the third student may feel much stronger regret when comparing his/her score with the 
score of the second student though there is only 1 point difference.  
As mentioned before, the RT-B/LS model assumes that the levels of regret and 
rejoicing depend on the difference of the two compared performance values. Thus Regret 
(69, 70) < Regret (70, 79) no matter what the background context is because Difference 
(69, 70) = 1 < Difference (70, 79) =9. However, this result may not always make sense as 
illustrated above. The RDRM model measures regret by considering the absolute values 
of the utilities of the chosen and forgone alternatives rather than simply their difference. 
The proposed approach is more reasonable than the RT-B/LS model. However, if a DM 
wants to describe a similar regret situation as that of the previous student scoring example, 
the two parameters B and S in the regret function G(.) need to be decided very carefully. 
Otherwise, it may produce the same result as that of the RT-B/LS model. Considering all 
the above issues, it can be seen that regret needs to be measured in a more realistic and 
flexible manner.  
4.2 Measuring Regret and Rejoicing by Using Linguistic Terms  
Please recall that decision criteria may be quantitative or qualitative. Regret and 
rejoicing are definitely qualitative aspects in decision problems. To deal with qualitative 
criteria, an approach proposed by Saaty [1980] as part of the AHP method has received 
widespread attention. One of the key steps of that approach is to ask a DM to select a 
linguistic statement (from a small set of linguistic statements) that best describes his/her 
assessment of the relative importance of two alternatives when they are considered in 
terms of a single criterion at a time. A total of 9 linguistic statements which include 4 
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intermediate values are used to choose from because some psychological studies [Miller, 
1956] have shown that most individuals cannot simultaneously compare more than seven 
objects (plus or minus two). Each linguistic statement is also associated with a numerical 
value to reflect its natural importance.  
The idea of pairwise comparisons along with the application of linguistic 
statements can also be used to measure a DM’s anticipated regret and rejoicing values. 
(For simplicity, the following discussions are based on regret as rejoicing can be analyzed 
in an analogous manner.) According to the rule of 7 plus or minus two, a set of 9 
linguistic choices which include 4 intermediate values can be developed and used to 
estimate a DM’s anticipated regret value for choosing one alternative and forgoing 
another one under a specific criterion. Each linguistic term is attached to a numerical 
value as shown in Table 3. 
Suppose we are considering two alternatives Ai and Aj and their performance 
values in terms of some benefit criterion Ck are aik and ajk, respectively. If aik > ajk, there 
is no regret for choosing aik over ajk. Then the regret value is equal to the lowest level 
which is attached with a value 1. Otherwise, a linguistic statement should be selected 
from Table 3 and the corresponding numerical value will be attached to the associated 
regret value. Please note that the numerical value attached to the lowest linguistic term 
“no distinguishable regret” is 1. This is the case because in Section 4 some multiplicative 
formulas will be proposed to process the data and the identity under numerical 




Table 3. Proposed scale for measuring pairwise regret values. 
Linguistic Expression umerical Value 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is not distinguishable.  
1 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is noticeable. 
3 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is strong. 
5 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is very strong. 
7 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is as strong as it can be. 
9 
The intermediate values of 2, 4, 6, and 8 are used when the DM 
feels that the best answer lies between two successive linguistic 
choices from the above list of choices.  
2, 4, 6, 8 
 
Following the above steps, the decision maker is able to fill in the entries of a 
pairwise comparison matrix for regret; one such matrix for each one of the decision 
criteria. These matrices are called here pairwise regret matrices. For simplicity, let us 
denote the entry of a typical pairwise regret matrix as rij (for i, j = 1,2,3, …, m). Then rij = 
R(aik, ajk), which is the anticipated regret for choosing alternative Ai and forgoing 
alternative Aj in terms of a specific decision criterion Ck. A complete pairwise regret 
matrix is shown in Figure 2.  
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              Alts.   
      (A1    A2  ... Am)  
    Alts. -----------------------  
     A1  1    r12  ... r1m  
     A2  r21   1   ... r2m  
       .   .    .  .  .  
     Am  rm1  rm2   ...  1  
            Figure 2. A typical pairwise regret matrix. 
The entries of a pairwise regret matrix should satisfy the following two basic conditions:  
(1) ri i = 1, for any i = 1, 2, 3, …, m; 
(2) If  ri j > 1, then  rj i = 1, for any i, j = 1, 2, 3, …, m. 
The first rule means that there is no regret when an alternative is compared to itself. The 
second rule means that if there is a certain level of regret for choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj, then there is no regret for choosing Aj over Ai.   
The use of this set of linguistic terms to estimate a DM’s anticipated regret 
feelings is in essence a mechanism for eliciting a hidden discrete regret function from the 
DM. This hidden discrete regret function might be different for different decision 
problems and/or decision criteria within the same problem. For example, a DM’s 
perception of regret might be different stepwise functions for different decision criteria. 
By using the linguistic terms, the DM has the flexibility to decide the specific tendencies 
of his/her anticipated regret feelings according to the specific situations of his/her 
decision problems.  
However, too much flexibility could sometime lead to arbitrary results. Thus 
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some consistency tests are needed to examine the general trend of a DM’s assessments of 
regret and make sure that the assessed pairwise regret values do not violate some basic 
psychological principles. When examining the consistency of the pairwise regret values, 
a reference point needs to be decided. The reference point could be the chosen 
alternative’s performance value or the forgone alternative’s performance value. Generally 
speaking, under a given reference point, the bigger the difference between two compared 
performance values is, the more likely is that the DM may have a stronger regret feeling 
for choosing the worse performance value and forgoing the better performance value. 
That is, under a given reference point, the DM’s perception of anticipated regret should 
be monotonically increasing with the increase of the difference between two compared 
performance values. Based on this principle, two tests are developed next to examine if 
there is any evident inconsistency within the DM’ assessments of the pairwise regret 
values.  
Without loss of generality, suppose that the performance values of m alternatives 
in terms of the k-th benefit criterion are sorted in ascending order such that a1k < a2k < a3k 
< a4k < … < amk. By using the chosen performance value and the forgone performance 
value as reference points individually, the pairwise regret values R(aik, ajk), for i, j =1, 2, 
3, ..., m and i < j, should satisfy the following two conditions: 
(1) R(aik, ajk) < R(aik, a(j+1)k) < ... < R(aik, amk).  
  For example: R(a1k, a2k) < R(a1k, a3k) < R(a1k, a4k) < ... < R(a1k, amk).     
(2) R(a1k, ajk) > R(a2k, ajk) > ... > R(a(j-1)k, ajk).    
     For example: R(a1k, amk) > R(a2k, amk) > R(a3k, amk) > ... > R(a(m-1)k, amk).  
For each criterion, if the DM is consistent with his/her assessments, then his/her 
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anticipated regret values should satisfy the above two relations. Otherwise, the DM needs 
to re-assess the inconsistent parts of his/her assessments. The above tests are further 
illustrated in a numerical example in Section 6.  
Please note that the proposed linguistic scale and definition of the pairwise 
comparisons are fundamentally different than those introduced by Saaty as part of the 
AHP method. In Saaty’s scale, linguistic terms are used to assess the relative importance 
of two alternatives (that is, the ratio of their importance) in terms of each one of the 
decision criteria or the relative importance of two criteria at a time. Some examples of 
such linguistic expressions are “A is more important than B” or “A is of the same 
importance as B,” or “A is a little more important than B,” and so on [Saaty, 1980 and 
1994]. According to Saaty’s scale, the available numerical values for the pairwise 
comparisons are members of the set: {9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, 1/6, 1/7, 
1/8, 1/9}. If in the evaluation of two alternatives, say Ai and Aj, the DM selects some 
entry from the scale with a value from the sub-interval [1, 9], then the reciprocal 
comparison of comparing alternative Aj with alternative Ai takes on the reciprocal of the 
previous value. That is, the value is in the interval [1/9, 1]. For instance, if aij = 7, then aji 
= 1/7. On the other hand, with the proposed linguistic scale, if rij takes a value between [1, 
9], then rji will always have the value 1. This means that if there is a certain level of 
regret for choosing alternative Ai over alternative Aj in terms of criterion Ck, then there is 
no regret (i.e., the corresponding value is equal to 1) for choosing Aj over Ai under the 
same criterion. This follows directly from the definition of the concept of regret and the 
need to use multiplication in the related formulas. 
Another major difference between the two linguistic scales is that the elicited 
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pairwise values are subject to different consistency tests. When using Saaty’s scale to 
assess the relative importance of each pair of the alternatives (or criteria), if all the 
pairwise comparisons are perfectly consistent with each other, then the following relation 
should always be true for any three comparisons aik , ajk , and aij [Saaty, 1980]:   
                aik×ajk = aij , for any 1 < i, j, k < m.   
The previous consistency test makes sense because of the very way pairwise comparisons 
are defined by Saaty; they are ratios of relative importance of two decision entities 
(alternatives or criteria). However, with the proposed linguistic scale, it is not required 
that a DM has to assess his/her level of regret as the ratio of two performance values. The 
DM has the flexibility to adapt the use of the new linguistic scale to the nature of a given 
decision problem. For example, a DM may decide his/her level of regret by comparing 
the chosen and forgone performance values individually with a specific threshold value 
as in the student score example. Thus their assessed pairwise regret values do not need to 
satisfy Saaty’s consistency relation but instead they need to satisfy the two consistency 










CHAPTER 5. A MCDM METHOD BASED O REGRET AD REJOICIG         
At this point it is assumed that the DM has developed the regret and rejoicing 
pairwise comparison matrices for a given decision problem. In this section, a 
multiplicative MCDM approach is proposed to process the data in these matrixes and also 
to aggregate the regret and rejoicing values with the criterion values in order to derive the 
final priorities of the alternatives and then rank them.   
5.1 A Multiplicative MCDM Model Based on Regret and Rejoicing 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some studies have reported that some types of rank 
reversals may occur with the original AHP method and the revised AHP method. Most of 
the problematic situations of the additive AHP methods can be attributed to the required 
normalization and also the use of an additive formula on the data of the decision matrix 
for deriving the overall performance values of the alternatives. However, in the WPM 
model and the multiplicative AHP method, the use of an additive formula is avoided by 
using a multiplicative expression. By using the multiplicative formula, no matter how the 
decision matrix is normalized, the ratios of the alternatives’ performance values are kept 
the same because the normalization factor is cancelled off in the multiplicative formula. 
Thus most of the ranking irregularities which occurred with the additive AHP methods 
will not happen with the multiplicative AHP method.  
Because of the above mentioned virtues, a similar multiplicatively formulated 
model is proposed to combine the alternatives’ performance values with their associated 
regret and rejoicing values. First, a formula as the one in (2-4) is used to aggregate the 
alternatives’ performance values under the different decision criteria. For an alternative Ai, 
its overall performance value is computed as follows:  
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= ∏ .                         (5-4) 
Next, the same formula is used to aggregate the alternatives’ regret and rejoicing values 
under each one of the decision criteria. Then, the overall regret value of alternative Ai is 
as follows: 









= ∏ .                (5-5) 
Similarly, the overall rejoicing associated with alternative Ai is: 









= ∏ .                           (5-6) 
In the above formulas, aik is the performance value of alternative Ai in terms of criterion 
Ck, and rik and jik are the anticipated regret and rejoicing values associated with Ai in 
terms of criterion Ck. To be consistent with the above multiplicative formulas, rik is 
defined as the geometric mean of the regret contributions generated when alternative Ai is 
compared with each of the other alternatives under the decision criterion Ck. That is, 
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Similarly, jik is defined as follows:   
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= ∏ .                     (5-8) 
Next, a ratio formula is used to combine the alternatives’ overall performance 
values, overall regret and rejoicing values together so that any potential normalization 
operation would not be able to affect the proportion of these three parts playing in the 
alternatives’ final priority values. Assume that a DM wishes to consider his/her 
anticipated regret and rejoicing for a given MCDM problem which has m alternatives and 
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n benefit decision criteria. The formula for computing the final priority of each 






























 for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.       (5-9) 
Since regret is like a cost criterion (i.e., the smaller the value the better) it is placed in the 
denominator of the above formula. On the contrary, rejoicing is like a benefit criterion 
(i.e., the higher the value the better) thus it is placed in the numerator of the above 
formula.    
A more general decision problem is assumed to have m alternatives and n decision 
criteria of which, without loss of generality, the first n1 are benefit criteria and the 
remaining (n-n1) are cost criteria. When considering both the anticipated regret and 
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(5-10) 
Where B
iR is the overall anticipated regret of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;  
B
iJ is the overall anticipated rejoicing of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;  
B






iP have the similar meaning as the above ones but in terms of the cost 
criteria.  
As mentioned before, next either one of the following two rules could be used to 
rank two alternatives:  
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For example, to compare two alternatives Ai and Aj, the following ratio can be calculated 
(for simplicity, assume that all the criteria are benefit criteria):  
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In general, if R(Ai / Aj ) > 1, it indicates that Ai is more preferable than Aj. For a stricter 
ranking, a threshold value could be used to decide if the difference between two priority 
values is significant enough to conclude with high confidence that one is more preferable 
than the other. For example, assume that we get * *
1 2P P> . Then in order to decide with 
high confidence that A1 is more preferable than A2, their final priorities may need to 
satisfy a more restrictive relation as follows: 









≥     .                  (5-12) 
The above relation means that one priority value should be at least larger than the other 
one by a threshold percentage in order to conclude with high confidence that one is more 
preferable than the other.  
The threshold value can be decided by the situation of a specific application. For a 
general purpose, it could be 10%. Please note that with the introduction of a threshold 
value, the rankings of the alternatives may become intransitive. For example, 
assume * * *








3P are very small and could not satisfy 
inequality (5-12), A1 will be ranked as equal to A2 and A2 will be ranked as equal to A3. 
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From the transitivity point of view, one would expect that A1 should also be ranked as 
equal to A3. However, the difference between A1 and A3 may be large enough to satisfy 
inequality (5-12), and then A1 will be ranked higher than A3.  
One needs to keep in mind the presence of a computability issue when using the 
proposed multiplicative formulas. This issue is associated with the scales that are used to 
measure the alternatives’ performance values under the criteria. Scales for measurement 
can be nominal (for example, gender), ordinal (for example, degree of satisfaction), 
interval (for example, temperature) or ratio (for example, length). The difference between 
an interval scale and a ratio scale is that a ratio scale has a natural zero point but an 
interval scale does not. Because it has a natural zero, a ratio scale is unique under a 
positive multiplicative transformation. This means that any ratio scale can be multiplied 
by a positive constant and the result would still be a ratio scale of the same phenomenon, 
but just in different units [Drummond et al., 2005]. This property is used, for example, to 
convert feet to yards, or meters to miles.  
However, an interval scale has no natural zero. It is unique under a positive linear 
transformation [Drummond et al., 2005]. This means that any interval scale x can be 
transformed to a scale y using a function y = a + bx, where a can be any constant and b 
can be any positive constant. The result will still be an interval scale of the same 
phenomenon, but in different units and with a different zero point. For instance, this 
property can be used to convert temperature from Fahrenheit (F) to Celsius (C) units.  
As result of the above, ratios of differences between interval scores have meaning, 
but ratios of interval scores do not. For example, with temperature, it is correct to state 
that the difference between 80F and 40F is twice the difference between 60F and 40F, but 
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it is not correct to state that 80F is twice as hot as 40F. The first statement holds true 
whether the temperature is measured in F or C, while the second does not. For a ratio 
scale, both types of ratios have meaning. For instance, in length, it is both correct to state 
that the difference between 80 miles and 40 miles is twice as much as the difference 
between 60 miles to 40 miles, and 80 miles is twice as long as 40 miles. Both of the 
statements remain true no matter the lengths are measured in inches or miles.  
Because of the above properties with ratio scale and interval scale, under the 
proposed multiplicative formulas, the ratio of two performance values measured by a 
ratio scale is the same no matter what unit is used. For example, the ratio of two 
monetary values expressed in Euros is the same as that of the two values expressed in US 
Dollars. But the ratio of two performance values measured by an interval scale might be 
different if they are transformed to other units. For instance, the ratio of two temperature 
values 40F and 60F is different when exactly the same temperature values are expressed 
in Celsius units. Please note that this problem lies in the use of the interval scale itself. 
Whether they are operated by additive or multiplicative formula, the proportions or the 
ratios of interval scores might be different if they are expressed in another unit. Users 
should be aware of this problem when they use interval scales. If it is unavoidable to use 
an interval scale to measure alternatives in terms of some criterion, it might be necessary 
to check how the ranking result might be changed when a different unit is used (such as 
the F and C units for temperature). If all criteria are measured by using ratio scales, there 
is no such problem.  
5.2 Influence of Dominated Alternatives and the Intransitivity Problem 
Though using the multiplicative formula can avoid the negative influence of 
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normalization operations, the way to measure regret/rejoicing introduces new 
interdependences into the ranking of the alternatives. As discussed in Section 3.2, when 
regret and rejoicing are measured by considering all available alternatives, the anticipated 
regret and rejoicing associated with one alternative will be influenced by the number of 
the considered alternatives (i.e., the cardinality of the set of the alternatives). By 
introducing or deleting a dominated alternative, the alternatives’ associated regret and 
rejoicing values might be changed and then the ranking of them might also be altered or 
even completely reversed. It is not hard for someone to fabricate some nonexistent or 
arbitrary dominated alternatives and add them into the set of alternatives in order to boost 
his/her own preferred alternatives in an unfair way. Thus it is further suggested that 
dominated alternatives should be eliminated before using the proposed method to rank a 
set of alternatives and regret and rejoicing should be better measured by considering all 
available Pareto-optimal (i.e., nondominated) alternatives. In this manner the negative 
influence of dominated alternatives could be avoided and the idea of measuring regret 
and rejoicing by considering the existence of other alternatives instead of only the 
alternatives with the best criteria values is also considered to a certain degree. 
Because of the same reason, the ranking of the alternatives by using the new 
method may not follow the transitivity property when they are ranked two at a time and 
regret and rejoicing are measured in terms of only the two alternatives. However, 
occurrence of this particular kind of intransitivity may not always be a negative aspect. 
Some studies [May, 1954; Tversky, 1969; Roberts, 1972] have shown that a rational DM 
may exhibit a certain level (although of limited size) of intransitivity in his/her 
comparison of alternatives in the decision-making process. Some degree of inconsistency 
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seems to be inherent in human decision-making. Thus it might be natural to allow certain 
intransitivity to exist in a decision-making process where emotional factors are involved. 
However, the fact that intransitivity may be exhibited by rational decision makers 
does not mean that a very large number of intransitive cases are necessarily a benign 
aspect to have. As mentioned before, the ELECTRE II and III methods were shown in 
[Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] to exhibit very high frequencies of intransitivity within 
a large number of simulated problems and also on a random collection of real-life case 
studies. To get a feeling about the intransitivity rate of the proposed method, a similar test 
was carried out to the new method by using some simulated decision problems.  
In the simulated decision problems, the number of the alternatives and the number 
of criteria were set to the following 7 values: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Thus, a total of 49 (that is, 
7×7) different cases were examined with 5,000 randomly generated decision problems 
per case. For each simulated decision problem, the corresponding regret matrixes which 
satisfy the consistency tests described in Section 3.2 were also generated randomly. 
During the test, each simulated decision problem was decomposed into a set of smaller 
problems, each defined on two alternatives at a time and the same number of criteria as in 
the original problem. Then the alternatives in the smaller problems were ranked and the 
rankings were examined. Any occurred intransitivity among the paired rankings was 
recorded. Figure 3 shows the test results. In this figure, different curves correspond to 
cases with different numbers of alternatives; the horizontal axis stands for the number of 
criteria and the vertical axis is the rate of intransitivity that occurred in the 5,000 
simulated decision problems.  
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Figure 3. Intransitivity rate of the new method. 
As reported in [Triantaphyllou, 2000] and [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], the 
same kind of intransitivity could also happen with the original and the revised AHP 
methods, and the ELECTRE II and III methods. For a simple comparison, when the 
number of alternatives is 9 and the number of criteria is 7, according to the test results 
reported in those studies, the intransitivity rate of the original AHP method is about 10%; 
for the revised AHP method it is about 26%; for the ELECTRE II method, it is about 85%; 
while for the ELECTRE III method it is almost 100%. According to the results shown in 
Figure 3, for the new method the intransitivity rate is about 44%. However, the 





CHAPTER 6. A UMERICAL EXAMPLE AD SOME SESITIVITY  
             AALYSES  
6.1 A umerical Example 
In this chapter a numerical example is used to illustrate the application of the 
proposed method. It is a simulated example and the data were generated randomly by a 
computer program. In this example, there are 4 alternatives and 3 criteria. The 
performance values of the alternatives under the three criteria are as follows:   





 19    6    15  
 15    7     4 
  4    9    16 
  5   12     4 
The weights of the criteria are: W = [0.35 0.42 0.23]; 
For simplicity, assume that the DM only wants to consider his/her anticipated 
regret. In terms of the three decision criteria, the corresponding regret matrixes are 
simulated as follows. The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C1 is 
assumed to be as follows: 





 1    1    1    1 
 3    1    1    1 
 8    6    1    2 
 5    4    1    1 
 
 52
The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C2 is assumed to be as follows: 





 1    8    8    8  
 1    1    3    6  
 1    1    1    4  
 1    1    1    1 
 
The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C3 is assumed to be as follows: 





 1    1    3    1  
 3    1    4    1 
 1    1    1    1  
 3    1    4    1 
 
Now we need to examine if the above simulated regret values satisfy the two 
consistency relations described in Section 4.2. After some examination, it was found that 
they did satisfy the consistency tests. For instance, in terms of the second criterion, the 
four alternatives’ performance values are 6, 7, 9, and12. They are in ascending order 
because of a12 < a22 < a32 < a42. From the simulated regret matrix in terms of the second 
criterion, it can be seen that: 
 (1)  R(a12, a22) = 8 < R(a12, a32) = 8 < R(a12, a42) = 8. 
       R(a22, a32) = 3 < R(a22, a42) = 6. 
 (2)  R(a12, a42) = 8 > R(a22, a42) = 6 > R(a32, a42) = 4.  
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       R(a12, a32) = 8 > R(a22, a32) = 6. 
This shows that these regret values satisfy the two consistency relations. Similarly, the 
pairwise regret values under the other criteria can also be examined.    
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Where rik is the anticipated regret value associated with alternative Ai in terms of criterion 
Ck, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and k = 1, 2, 3. All of the above values can also be put in a table as 
follows (please note that the equivalent decimal expressions are used in this table):  





    1.0000    8.0000    1.4422 
    1.4422    2.6207    2.2894 
    4.5789    1.5874    1.0000 
    2.7144    1.0000    2.2894 
 
Then, by applying formula (5-9), we can get the final preference values of these 
alternatives.  
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2 3.899P =
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3 3.74P =
       
*
4 3.998P =  
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Without considering any threshold value for the final ranking of the alternatives, the 
above results indicate:  A1 f  A4 f  A2 f  A3.  
If using the ratio formula (5-11), we can get:  










































































The above ratios indicate the same ranking as before as it should be.  
6.2 Some Sensitivity Analyses 
Sometimes it is hard for a DM to precisely capture his/her perception of regret 
and rejoicing by using a specific linguist term. Thus, it is necessary to study how changes 
of regret and rejoicing values could affect the ranking results of the decision problems. 
There are many studies on sensitivity analysis for deterministic MCDM models [Masuda, 
1990; Armacost and Hosseini, 1994]. Usually, a sensitivity analysis aims at examining 
how changes on the weights of the criteria or changes on the performance values of the 
alternatives could affect the ranking results of the decision problems. In [Triantaphyllou 
and Sanchez, 1997; Triantaphyllou, 2000], these two types of sensitivity problems were 
analyzed in detail and two corresponding sensitivity analysis approaches were proposed 
for three major MCDM methods which included the weighted sum model, the weighted 
product model, and the additive AHP methods. The first approach aims at determining 
what the smallest changes in the current weights of the criteria are which can alter the 
existing ranking of the alternatives. The second approach uses the same concept as the 
first one to determine how critical the various performance values of the alternatives (in 
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terms of a single decision criterion at a time) are in the ranking of the alternatives 
[Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Both of these two approaches can also be applied 
straightforwardly to the proposed new method for solving the same kinds of sensitivity 
analysis problems.  
Following the same approach as in [Triantaphyllou, 2000], next some sensitivity 
analysis procedures are developed to determine what the minimum change is in a specific 
regret value such that the ranking between two alternatives will be altered.  
6.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis in Terms of an Alternative’s Aggregated Regret Value  
     under a Given Criterion 
Suppose the criteria of a decision problem are all benefit criteria and the DM is 
interested to see how change in a specific regret value might be able to alter the ranking 
between two alternatives Ai and Aj. Let rik represent the associated regret of alternative Ai 
under criterion Ck; let Ti k j denote the change in the regret value rik (all the other regret 
values are kept the same) such that the ranking of alternatives Ai and Aj will be altered. 
First, let us assume, before the change of rik, the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj is 
Ai f  Aj. Then, by using the proposed method, the ratio R(Ai / Aj ) should be greater than 
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(Ai / Aj) denote the new ratio after the Ti k j change has occurred on the regret value 
rik. The new ratio should be less than or equal to 1. Let ti k j denote the threshold value of 
Ti k j, which is the minimum change that has to occur in rik such that the original ranking 
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From the above relation and R(Ai / Aj ) > 1, we can get 
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(6-2) 
From inequality (6-2), it can be seen that if the regret value rik is increased by at 
least 100%Q× , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered.  
Next, assume the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj is Ai p  Aj. Then R(Ai / 
Aj ) should be less than 1 and the new ratio R 
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From the above relation and R(Ai / Aj ) < 1, we can get 
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/ (1 ) .ik ikr Q r≤ +                           (6-4) 
From inequality (6-4), it can be seen that if the regret value rik is decreased by at 
least 100%Q × , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered.  
Furthermore, the following condition should also be satisfied for the changed 
regret value to be feasible:  
/
, , , ,1, 1ik ik i k j i k j ikr r or rτ τ= + ≥     ≥ − . 
The above relation is true because 1 is the minimum regret value for the proposed 
multiplicative model and it cannot be decreased further. In summary, to alter the ranking 
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between two alternatives Ai and Aj, the value of Ti,k j; the change in the single regret value 
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Please note, if Ti,k j is positive, it means that the regret value rik needs to be increased in 
order to alter the ranking between Ai and Aj. Otherwise, it needs to be decreased.    
The same sensitivity analysis can also be carried out to determine what the change 
is in a specific rejoicing value which can alter the ranking between two alternatives Ai 
and Aj. Let Oi k,j denote the change in the rejoicing value jik (all the other rejoicing values 
are kept the same) such that the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. Similar 













ik i k j i j
i
A
j O j R if originally A A
A
A
j R O if originally A A
A
   
  1− ≤  ≤ − <              
  
   




For instance, applying the above sensitivity analysis results to the example in 
Section 5.1, we can get a 3-D table as Table 4. In Table 4, the entry (i, k, j) is the Q value 
corresponding to ti k j, the minimum change in rik. The value of Q is the minimum 
percentage that rik need to be changed such that the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj 
will be altered. For instance, the entry (2, 1, 3) is 0.0146 which is the Q value 
corresponding to t2 1 3. This value indicates that if the regret value of r21 is increased by at 
least 1.46% from the current value (i.e., 1.442) to (1+0.0146)×1.442 = 1.463, the ranking 
between A2 and A3 will be altered. Similarly, the entry (3, 2, 4) is -0.0276. It indicates that 
if the regret value of r32 is decreased by at least 2.76% from the current value (i.e., 1.5874) 
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to (1-0.0276)× 1.5874 = 1.5436, the ranking between A3 and A4 will be altered.  
 Table 4. Threshold values in relative terms for the example in Section 5.1. 
 
Alt.(Ai) 
       Criterion Ck  






























































Please note, if originally rik = 1 (which means that there is no regret when 
alternative Ai is compared with all the others under the k-th criterion and the performance 
value of Ai is better than or equal to those of the others under the same criterion), it is 
infeasible to decrease or increase this regret value. Thus there is no corresponding 
feasible Ti,k j and Q values. For instance, for the example in Section 5.1, the value of r11 is 
1. Thus the Q values corresponding to t1 1 j, for j = 2, 3, and 4, are all infeasible 
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(represented by =/A; not applicable). For the same reason, there are no feasible Q values 
which correspond to t3 3 j, for j = 1, 2, 4 and t4 2 j, for j =1, 2, 3. Thus these entries are all 
represented by =/A in Table 4.       
From formula (5-7), it can be seen that rik is the geometric mean of the (m-1) 
regret contributions generated when alternative Ai is compared with the other (m-1) 
alternatives under the decision criterion Ck. Thus, the change in rik is an aggregated effect 
of the possible changes in all these individual regret contributions. Sometimes, the DM 
may want to further find out how an individual regret contribution could affect the 
ranking results. By simple deduction, it can be seen that if all the other individual regret 
contributions are kept the same and only one of them need to be changed, then the change 
in this one should be at least as big as (m-1) times of the previously derived value so that 
it could cause the ranking between two alternatives to be altered. This type of sensitivity 
analysis could be too cumbersome for a large-sized decision problem and result in too 
many sensitivity scenarios. However, in case it is needed for some small-sized decision 
problems, a formal mathematical derivation is also presented in the next section.  
6.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis in Terms of an Alternative’s Associated Pairwise Regret  
     Values under a Given Criterion 
Similarly, suppose that the interest is to alter the ranking between alternatives Ai 
and Aj and all the criteria are benefit criteria. Let r(aik, alk) represent the associated regret 
of alternative Ai when comparing its performance value aik with alternative Al ’s 
performance value alk under the criterion Ck, for l = 1, …, m; let bi k l denote the 
coefficient of the change in the regret value r(aik, alk) (all the other regret values are kept 
the same) such that the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. First, assume that 
 61
originally Ai f  Aj, then R(Ai / Aj) > 1. Let R
/
(Ai / Aj) denote the new ratio after the 
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From the above inequality, it can be seen that if the regret value r(aik, alk) is increased by 
at least 100%P × , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. Similarly, if we assume 















≤ <        
and  
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, which indicates that if the regret value r(aik, alk) is 
decreased by at least 100%P × , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. 
Using the above results, DMs could examine how changes of regret or rejoicing 
values might affect the ranking results of the decision problems. It is believed that DMs 
can make more careful assessments about their regret and rejoicing feelings if they can 
see how sensitive the ranking results could be to the changes in these values. According 
to the results of sensitivity analysis, they may want to reassess some of their anticipated 
regret and rejoicing levels for better predication. Meanwhile, they can also obtain a more 
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comprehensive understanding about the ranking of the alternatives and finally choose the 





















CHAPTER 7. ITRODUCTIO TO A FUZZY VERSIO OF THE EW 
            METHOD 
In Chapter 3 it is proposed to use crisp numbers to represent the natural 
importance of the linguistic terms for measuring regret and rejoicing. Because of the 
potential impreciseness within the linguistic terms, they can also be represented by fuzzy 
numbers. As pointed out in [Chen and Liao, 1996], fuzzy numbers employ a range of 
values instead of one crisp number, they are more in line with the uncertainty nature of 
many decision problems and the subjective nature of evaluations. The DM’s assessments 
of anticipated regret and rejoicing feelings are subjective evaluations. The uncertainty 
and imprecision which is inherent in their assessments of regret and rejoicing can be 
accounted for by considering each of these emotional factors as fuzzy quantities, 
characterized by appropriate membership functions.   
Except measuring regret and rejoicing by fuzzy numbers, for some decision 
problems, the performance values of the alternatives and the weights of the criteria may 
also need to be expressed by fuzzy numbers. For example, sometimes it is hard to assess 
precisely the performance values of the alternatives in terms of some qualitative criteria; 
it could also be hard to decide the weights of the criteria because of lack of complete 
information or some other potential vagueness in the decision problems. Under these 
situations, the data of the decision problems may need to be evaluated by using fuzzy 
numbers. With all these fuzzy data, a fuzzy version of the new method will be necessary. 
The fuzzy version of the proposed method shares the same core algorithm as before 
except that all the input data are fuzzy numbers and all the mathematical operations are 
fuzzy operations.  
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7.1 A Brief Introduction on Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Operations  
Fuzzy set theory was developed for solving problems in which descriptions of 
activities and observations are imprecise, vague, and uncertain [Chen and Hwang, 1992]. 
Fuzzy sets are sets whose elements have different grades of membership in the interval [0, 
1]. A membership function which assigns to each element a grade of membership is 
associated with each fuzzy set [Chen and Hwang, 1992]. Fuzzy sets were introduced by 
Lotfi A. Zadeh [1965] as an extension of the classical notion of sets. In classical set 
theory, the membership of elements in a set is assessed by binary values. If an element 
belongs to the set, its membership will be 1. Otherwise, it will be 0. Fuzzy sets generalize 
classical sets, since the indicator functions of classical sets are special cases of the 
membership functions of fuzzy sets, if the latter only take values 0 or 1 [Dubois and 
Prade, 1980]. 
A general definition of a fuzzy number is given by [Dubois and Prade, 1978; and 
1980] as follows: any fuzzy subset M = {(x, uM(x))}, where x takes its number on the real 
line R and uM(x) ∈  [0, 1]. The membership function denotes the degree of truth that M 
takes a specific number x /. Two fuzzy numbers are equal if and only if they have the 
same membership functions. There are different types of fuzzy numbers. Two widely 
used are triangular type of fuzzy numbers and trapezoidal type of fuzzy numbers. Among 
these two, triangular fuzzy numbers are more often used because they are simpler 
compared to the more complex trapezoid fuzzy numbers. The triangular fuzzy numbers 
have lower, modal, and upper values. Let A%
 
represent a triangular fuzzy number. Its 
membership function can be expressed as follows: 
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Where ( )L
A
f x%  and ( )
R
A
f x%  are the left and the right spread membership functions. l, m, 
and u are real numbers and l < m < u, and they stand for the lower, the modal, and the 
upper values of fuzzy number A% , respectively. As represented by the above membership 
function, fuzzy number A%
 
can also be denoted as (l, m, u).  
From the above description, it can be seen that fuzzy numbers are fuzzy sets 
which are characterized by different membership functions. For any application involving 
impreciseness and fuzziness, a vital step is the definition/generation of membership 
functions associated with fuzzy concepts. In general, there are two ways to generate 
membership functions. One is to define them subjectively. Interested readers may refer to 
[MacVicar-Whelan, 1978; Norwich and Turksen 1984; Turksen, 1991] where some 
membership function generation techniques that reflect subjective perception about vague 
or imprecise concepts were discussed. There are also some data-driven membership 
function generation techniques. A general overview of several methods for generating 
membership functions from domain data for fuzzy pattern recognition applications can be 
found in [Medasani, et al., 1998]. Since then, more methods have been developed. An 
example is the fuzzy c-means variant for the generation of fuzzy term sets as developed 
by Liao et al. [2003]. After the membership function for each fuzzy variable is decided 
and the fuzzy data is collected, the next step is to apply the necessary operations on the 
fuzzy numbers. 
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Fuzzy number operations were first introduced by [Dubois and Prade, 1978; and 
1980]. Let 
1 1 1 1( , , )l m un n n n=% and 2 2 2 2( , , )l m un n n n=% represent two triangular fuzzy 
numbers. In [Laarhoven and Pedrycz, 1983], the basic operations of triangular fuzzy 
numbers are defined as follows: 
(1) Addition: 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , )l l m m u un n n n n n n n⊕ = + + +% %  
(2) Negation: ○一 1 1 1 1( , , )u m ln n n n= − − −%  
(3) Multiplication: 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , )l l m m u un n n n n n n n⊗ = × × ×% %   
(4) Division: 1 1 1 11 / (1 / ,1 / ,1 / )u m ln n n n≅%  
For the special case of raising a triangular fuzzy number to the power of another 
triangular fuzzy number, the approximation 2 2 22
1 1 1 1( , , )
l m un n nn
l m un n n n≅
%
% can be used.   
After the fuzzy data are processed by the proposed new method, the final 
priorities of the alternatives will also be fuzzy numbers. Since a fuzzy number represents 
many possible real numbers that have different membership values, it is not easy to 
compare the final ratings to determine which alternatives are preferred [Chen and Hwang, 
1992]. Many fuzzy ranking methods have been developed to compare fuzzy numbers. For 
some review of these methods, interested readers may refer to [Bortolan and Degani, 
1985; Chen and Hwang, 1992; Chang and Lee, 1994; Dubois and Prade, 1999; 
Lee-Kwang and Lee, 1999]. Under a given situation, usually people decide which method 
should be used by considering the complexity of the algorithm, its flexibility, accuracy, 
ease of interpretation and the shape of the fuzzy numbers which are used [Triantaphyllou, 
2000]. The selection is also closely related to the application of the MCDM methods.   
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7.2 A umerical Example on the Fuzzy Version of the ew Method 
In this section, a similar numerical example as the one in Section 5.1 is used to 
demonstrate how the fuzzy version of the proposed method can be implemented. For 
simplicity, triangular fuzzy numbers are used to represent the fuzzy data in this example. 
The fuzzy performance values and the fuzzy weights of the criteria come from a simple 
fuzzification of the corresponding crisp data in the original example. The original crisp 
data become the modals of the corresponding fuzzy data. The lower and upper parts of 
the fuzzy data are constructed by choosing a certain value as the spreads of the triangular 
fuzzy numbers.  
In the original version of the proposed method, 9 crisp numbers are used to 
represent the natural importance of the linguistic terms. For the fuzzy version of the 
method, the fuzzy triangular numbers attached to the fuzzy linguistic terms will be 
constructed based on them. The 9 crisp numbers are used as the modals of the 
corresponding 9 triangular fuzzy numbers. For simplicity, value 1 is chosen as both the 
left and the right spreads of these fuzzy numbers except for the two end values. For the 
lowest linguistic term, the lower value of its associated fuzzy number should not be 
smaller than the minimum value 1 of the original scale. Thus its left spread is 0 and its 
lower and modal values are the same. For the highest linguistic term, the upper value of 
its associated fuzzy number should not be higher than the original maximum value 9. 
Then, its right spread is set to be 0 and its modal and upper values are the same. The 
original linguistic terms are fuzzified to fit into the fuzzy situation. After all the above 
adjustments, the fuzzy linguistic terms and the triangular fuzzy numbers attached to them 
are as follows:   
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Table 5. A fuzzy scale for the fuzzy version of the new method. 
Linguistic Expression     Fuzzy value 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is barely distinguishable.  
(1,  1,  2) 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj may be noticeable. 
(2,  3,  4) 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is nearly strong. 
(4,  5,  6) 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is almost very strong. 
(6,  7,  8) 
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over 
alternative Aj is almost as strong as it can be. 
(8,  9,  9) 
The corresponding intermediate fuzzy numbers are used 
when the decision maker feels that the best answer lies 
between two successive fuzzy linguistic choices from the 
above list of choices.  
(1,  2,  3), (3,  4,  5),  
(5,  6,  7), (7,  8,  9) 
 
From now on, fuzzy alternatives and fuzzy criteria are denoted as Âi
 
and ˆ
kC  in 
order to distinguish them from their crisp version counterparts which are denoted as Ai 
and Ck. According to the previous description, the fuzzy performance values of the 




      
1Ĉ                2Ĉ               3Ĉ  
1Â  
(18,  19,  20)     ( 5,   6,   7)     (14,  15,  16) 
2Â  
(14,  15,  16)     ( 6,   7,   8)     ( 3,   4,   5) 
3Â  
( 3,   4,   5)     ( 8,   9,  10)     (15,  16,  17) 
4Â  
( 4,   5,   6)     (11,  12,  13)     ( 3,   4,   5) 
 
The fuzzy weights of the fuzzy criteria are:  
W = [(0.25, 0.35, 0.45)   (0.32, 0.42, 0.52)   (0.13, 0.23, 0.33)];   
For crisp data, the sum of weights should be equal to 1. Now it is required that the sum of 
the modals of the fuzzy weights values should be equal to 1.   
After replacing the original crisp regret values by the corresponding triangular 
fuzzy numbers, now the simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of the three 




1Ĉ     1Â            2Â             3Â
           
4Â  
1Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     
2Â  
(2,  3,  4)    (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     
3Â  
(7,  8,  9)    (5,  6,  7)     (1,  1,  2)     (1,  2,  3) 
4Â  




The simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion 
2Ĉ
 
is as follows: 
2Ĉ     1Â            2Â             3Â
           
4Â  
1Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (7,  8,  9)     (7,  8,  9)     (7,  8,  9) 
2Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (2,  3,  4)     (5,  6,  7)     
3Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     (3,  4,  5)     
4Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     
 
The simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion 
3Ĉ  is as follows: 
3Ĉ     1Â            2Â             3Â
           
4Â  
1Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (2,  3,  4)     (1,  1,  2)     
2Â  
(2,  3,  4)    (1,  1,  2)     (3,  4,  5)     (1,  1,  2)     
3Â  
(1,  1,  2)    (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2)     (1,  1,  2) 
4Â  
(2,  3,  4)    (1,  1,  2)     (3,  4,  5)     (1,  1,  2) 
 
For fuzzy data, the consistency tests are recommended to be applied on the modals of the 
fuzzy regret values. Since the modals of the above fuzzy regret values are the crisp regret 
values in the original example, they satisfy the consistency tests as examined before.  
A fuzzy version of formula (4-7) is as follows:  









r r a a −
=  ≠
= ∏ .                      (7-1) 
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Please note, in this formula, the fuzzy regret value produced when an alternative is 
compared with itself is not counted into the computation. It is set so in case that the upper 
values of the aggregated regret values are inflated improperly. By applying formula (7-1), 
the fuzzy regret values of the alternatives in terms of the three criteria are as follows: 
îkr         1Ĉ                   2Ĉ                   3Ĉ  
1Â  
(1.00,  1.00,  2.00)   (7.00,  8.00,  9.00)    (1.26,  1.44,  2.52) 
2Â  
(1.26,  1.44,  2.52)   (2.15,  2.62,  3.83)    (1.82,  2.29,  3.42) 
3Â  
(3.27,  4.58,  5.74)   (1.44,  1.59,  2.71)    (1.00,  1.00,  2.00) 
4Â  
(2.29,  2.71,  3.91)   (1.00,  1.00,  2.00)    (1.82,  2.29,  3.42) 
 
In the above table, the entries are îkr  which is the fuzzy anticipated regret value 
associated with fuzzy alternative Âi  in terms of fuzzy criterion
ˆ
kC , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
k = 1, 2, 3. For example, 21ˆ (1.26 1.44 2.52).r =        


































 for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.         (7-2) 
By applying formula (7-2), the fuzzy preference values of the fuzzy alternatives are: 
*
1












ˆ (1.71, , ).P =   4.00   8.18
 
Next, a method that ranks fuzzy numbers based on a distance measure is used to 
rank the above four fuzzy numbers. This method was introduced by Tran and Duckstein 
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in [2002] where they developed a new class of distance measures for interval numbers 
that takes into account all the points in both intervals and then used it to formulate the 
distance measure for fuzzy numbers. Their method for ranking fuzzy numbers is based on 
a comparison of the distance from fuzzy numbers to some predetermined targets: the 
crisp maximum (Max) and the crisp minimum (Min). The idea is that a fuzzy number is 
ranked first if its distance to the crisp maximum (Dmax) is the smallest but its distance to 
the crisp minimum (Dmin) is the greatest [Tran and Duckstein, 2002]. According to the 
results of some numerical examples in [Tran and Duckstein, 2002], their method 
overcomes several shortcomings such as the indiscriminative and counterintuitive 
behavior of several existing fuzzy ranking methods. Meanwhile, its computation process 
is simple and the concept is easy to be perceived by DMs.  
In this method, the Max and Min are chosen as follows: 
1




Max I s A
=
≥   U
      
1




Min I s A
=
≤   U  
In the above formulas, s (Ai) is the support of fuzzy numbers Ai, i = 1, …, I. In [Tran and 
Duckstein, 2002], formulas to compute Dmax and Dmin for some of the commonly used 
fuzzy numbers with two different weighting functions are also provided. Due to space 
limitation, they are not described here in detail. For more detailed information, interested 
readers can refer to their original paper. When the weighting function f (α ) is set as f (α ) 
=α  that means more weights are given to intervals at higher α
 
levels, applying the 
Dmax and Dmin formulas for triangular fuzzy numbers to the previous four fuzzy 
preference values, the intermediate results are as follows:   
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f (α ) =α  
  
*
1P̂       
*
2P̂        
*
3P̂        
*
4P̂  
Dmax 5.7932    6.1988    6.4131    6.1496 
Dmin 3.8748    3.4803    3.2671    3.4914 
The above results indicate that the ranking of the four fuzzy alternatives is:  
1Â
 
f  4Â  f  2Â  f  3Â .  
One can observe that this ranking is identical to that of the crisp case. To show that a 
ranking method could make a difference, another method that ranks fuzzy numbers with 
integral values as proposed by Liou and Wang in [1992] was also used to rank the fuzzy 
numbers. When the parameter α
 
in this method is set equal to 0.5, the ranking of the 
fuzzy alternatives becomes:  
1Â  f  2Â  f  3Â  f  4Â . 
Though fuzzy data offer the capability to deal with imprecise information, they 
may also complicate the analysis of decision problems. First, mathematical operations of 
fuzzy data are not easy. This may greatly increase the mathematical computations. 
Second, though there have been many (perhaps, too many) fuzzy ranking methods, it 
could still be hard to clearly distinguish which fuzzy numbers (priority values) are better 
or worse. As illustrated above, different ranking methods may lead to different ranking 
results. Moreover, within the same method, different setting of the same parameter could 
also lead to different results. Both situations could complicate the ranking of fuzzy 
priority values. Then, it may be difficult to decide which alternatives should be ranked 
higher and which lower. Thus, the DMs should carefully study these issues before they 
decide whether to use fuzzy data and the fuzzy version of a specific MCDM method.  
Please note that the fuzzy version of the proposed MCDM method can be 
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accompanied with sensitivity analyses similar to ones developed for the crisp version of it. 
















CHAPTER 8. COCLUDIG REMARKS  
In this chapter, the main contributions of the research in this dissertation and their 
significance are summarized. Then, some possible future research directions are proposed 
to expand the research in this dissertation. 
8.1 Summary of the Research Contributions and Their Significance  
In conclusion, the research in this dissertation has achieved the following main 
contributions. First, a new MCDM method is proposed. Besides the usual benefit and cost 
criteria, the new method is able to incorporate the effects of regret and rejoicing for 
decision makers who value these emotional factors in MCDM situations. Most of the 
current MCDM methods consider only the cognitive aspects of decision-making 
problems and assume that the DMs are complete rational humans which are dissociated 
from psychological feelings. The significance of this new model lies in that unlike those 
MCDM methods, it considers the notion of regret and rejoicing and provides a better 
description of human behavior in decision-making and offers the DMs the flexibility to 
trade off some economic benefits explicitly in order to gain a state of psychological 
satisfaction.  
Second, within the new method, regret and rejoicing effects are determined by 
using linguistic terms. It is regarded as more reasonable and realistic to rational human 
behavior than using continuous functions. By using the linguistic terms, the DMs have 
the flexibility to decide their own regret/rejoicing levels and the specific tendencies of 
these feelings according to the specific situations of their decision problems. Furthermore, 
the proposed approach for eliciting regret and/or rejoicing by pairwise comparisons is 
flexible and adapts to the reactions of the individual DM and decision problem.  
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Third, by using the multiplicative formulas to compute the final priorities of the 
alternatives, the new method is immune to those rank reversal problems mentioned in the 
dissertation when regret and rejoicing are not considered. Then rank reversals may occur 
only as result of readjusting the effects of regret and/or rejoicing when the set of the 
alternatives is altered. It is a significant property of the new method. Because some 
well-known MCDM methods, like the additive AHP methods and the ELECTRE II and 
III methods, suffer from the rank reversals even without the consideration of regret and 
rejoicing. The effects of regret and rejoicing may be ignored if, for instance, their 
presence could be considered negligible when compared to the usual performance values 
of the alternatives under the benefit and cost criteria. Meanwhile, by using the 
multiplicative formulas, the new method is able to deal with qualitative and quantitative 
criteria expressed in different units of measurement.  
Fourth, some sensitivity analysis procedures are developed for the proposed 
method. Sometimes it is hard for a DM to precisely capture his/her perception of regret 
and rejoicing by using a specific linguist term. Thus, it is significant and necessary to 
study how changes of regret and rejoicing values could affect the ranking results of the 
decision problems. It is believed that DMs can make more careful assessments about their 
regret and rejoicing feelings if they can see how sensitive the ranking results could be to 
the changes in these values. Another meaning of this contribution is that by using a 
sensitivity analysis, the DM can obtain a more comprehensive understanding about the 
ranking of the alternatives and choose the one that is more stable than the others. 
Fifth, considering the potential impreciseness within the linguistic terms and the 
potential vagueness in the data of some decision problems, a fuzzy version of the new 
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method is also introduced. The uncertainty and imprecision which is inherent in a DM’s 
assessments of regret and rejoicing can be accounted for by considering each of these 
emotional factors as fuzzy quantities, characterized by appropriate membership functions. 
Sometimes, the data of the decision problems may also need to be evaluated by using 
fuzzy numbers. With all these potential fuzzy data, a fuzzy version of the new method is 
necessary and significant. However, mathematical operations of fuzzy data may also 
complicate the analysis of decision problems. Thus, the DMs should think about it 
carefully before they decide whether to use fuzzy data and the fuzzy version of the new 
method.  
Another significant contribution is that the introduction of emotional factors 
brings a new perspective to the issue of rank reversals. It was once thought that rank 
reversals resulted from a method’s own mathematical artifacts are unacceptable. However, 
as illustrated by the car example, strong emotional feelings like regret and rejoicing could 
make a DM to change his/her preference about the alternatives unintentionally and then 
change the ranking of them. The reason of rank reversals also lies in the way that regret 
and rejoicing are measured. Since the feeling of regret and rejoicing comes from the 
comparison of one alternative with the others, it is unavoidable that the levels of these 
factors depend on the existence of other alternatives. Thus, for the new method which 
incorporates these emotional factors, the occurrence of some rank reversals might be 
natural and acceptable.  
The main research in this dissertation has been summarized in the form of three 
journal articles. As mentioned previously, one of them has been published in a refereed 
journal. Another one is in print for publication also in a refereed journal. The latest one 
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which is on the study of regret and rejoicing with the collaboration with Dr. Edouard 
Kujawski, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, is going to be submitted for 
publication to the journal of Decision Sciences very soon. These articles have also been 
presented at several national and international conferences. For the details please see Part 
I of the reference list. 
8.2 Future Research Directions 
As mentioned before, the use of a set of linguistic terms to estimate a DM’s 
anticipated regret feelings is in essence a mechanism for eliciting a hidden discrete regret 
function. It offers a DM the flexibility to decide the specific tendency of his/her regret 
feeling based on the specific situation of his/her decision problem. However, sometimes, 
some DMs may not be able to clearly capture the tendency of their perception of regret 
and rejoicing. Thus, in the future, some shapes of discrete functions may need to be 
developed to model some general situations of humans’ perception of regret and rejoicing. 
These functions should be able to capture the realistic tendencies for most of the rational 
humans’ perception of these emotional feelings. Except this possible direction, as with 
other aspects of decision making, other scales could be employed to quantify the 
linguistic terms and replace the original nine evenly distributed integer values. For 
example, exponential values [Lootsma, 1999] might be more applicable for situations 
where there is evidence that regret and rejoicing feelings vary by a certain geometric 
progression factor.  
Undoubtedly, emotions and feelings are indispensable factors in humans’ 
decision-making activities. More research is needed in this fascinating area. A long march 
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of my research in this area has lead to the completion of this dissertation. However, this is 











































Part I by author 
 
Journal Papers and Book Chapter 
 
Wang, X., and E. Triantaphyllou, (2008), “Ranking Irregularities When Evaluating 
Alternatives by Using Some ELECTRE Methods,” Omega, Vol. 36, pp. 45-63. 
 
Wang, X., E. Triantaphyllou, and E. Kujawski, (2008), “Communication on the Paper ‘A 
Reference-Dependent Regret Model for Deterministic Tradeoff Studies’,” Systems 
Engineering, Vol. 11, pp 360-364. 
 
Wang, X., E. Triantaphyllou, and E. Kujawski, (2008), “A Study of regret and rejoicing 
and an MCDM method based on them,” to be submitted for publication to the 
journal of Decision Sciences. 
 
Wang, X. and E. Triantaphyllou, (2006), “Chapter 27: Ranking Irregularities when 
Evaluating Alternatives by Using Some Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
Methods,” Handbook of Industrial and Systems Engineering (A. Badiru, Editor), 




Wang, X., and E. Triantaphyllou, “A study of regret and rejoicing in decision-making and 
a new MCDM method based on them,” I=FORMS Annual Meeting, November 4-7, 
2007, Seattle, WA, USA. 
 
Wang, X., and E. Triantaphyllou, “Some Ranking Irregularities when ELECTRE 
Methods are used to Solve MCDM Problems,” I=FORMS Annual Meeting, 
October 24-27, 2004, Denver, CO, USA. 
 
Wang, X., and E. Triantaphyllou, “Ranking Irregularities with ELECTRE Methods,” IIE 
Annual Conference, May 15-19, 2004, Houston, TX, USA. 
 
Part II by other authors  
Allais, M., (1988), The general theory of random choices in relation to the invariant 
cardinal utility function and the specific probability function, Risk, Decision and 
Rationality, in Munier, editor, pp. 231-291, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.   
 
Armacost, R.L. and J.C. Hosseini, (1994), “Identification of determinant attributes using 
the analytic hierarchy process,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 
22, pp. 383-392. 
 
 82
Barzilai, J., and F.A. Lootsma, (1994), “Power Relations and Group Aggregation in the 
Multiplicative AHP and SMART,” Proceedings of the Third International 
Symposium on the AHP, George Washington University, Washington, DC, U.S.A., 
pp. 157-168. 
 
Bell, D.E., (1982), “Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty,” Operations Research, 
Vol.30, pp. 961-981. 
 
Bell, D.E., (1985), “Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty,” Operations 
Research, Vol. 33, pp.1-27. 
 
Belton, V. and Gear, A.E., (1983), “On a shortcoming of Saaty’s method of analytic 
hierarchies,” Omega, Vol.13, pp.143-144. 
 
Belton, V., and T.J. Stewart, (2001), “Chapter 8: Outranking Methods,” Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis: An Integrated Approach, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 
MA, U.S.A. 
 
Benayoun, R., B. Roy, and N. Sussman, (1966), “Manual de Reference du Programme 
Electre,” Note De Synthese et Formaton, No.25, Direction Scientifque SEMA, 
Paris, France. 
 
Bortolan, G., and R. Degani, (1985), “A review of some methods for ranking fuzzy 
subsets”, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol.15, pp.1-19. 
 
Buchanan, J.T., (1994), “An Experimental Evaluation of Interactive MCDM Methods and 
the Decision Making Process,” Journal of Operational Research Society, Vol. 45, 
pp. 1050-1059. 
 
Bridgeman, P.W., (1922), Dimensionless Analysis, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 
U.S.A. 
 
Browning, T.R., and D.A. Hillson, (2004), “A Quantitative Framework for 
Multi-Dimensional Risk and Opportunity Management,” 
http://sbufaculty.tcu.edu/tbrowning/publications5.htm. 
 
Chang, P.-T., and E.S. Lee, (1994), “Ranking of fuzzy sets based on the concept of 
existence,” Computers and Mathematics with Applications, Vol. 27, pp. 11-21. 
 
Chen, Q., and T.W. Liao, (1996), "A Comparative Study of Crisp and Fuzzy Hierarchical 
Pairwise Comparison Methods," Proc. of the first Int. Conf. on Industrial 
Engineering - Applications and Practice, Houston, TX, U.S.A., pp. 65-70. 
 
Chen, S.-J., and C.-L. Hwang, (1992), Fuzzy multiple attribute decision making: Methods 
and applications, Springer, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
 83
DeSanctis, G., and R.B. Gallupe, (1987), “A foundation for the study of group decision 
support systems,” Management Science, Vol. 33 (5), pp. 589-609. 
 
Doumpos, M., K. Kosmidou, G. Baourakis, and C. Zopounidis (2002), “Credit risk 
assessment using a multicriteria hierarchical discrimination approach: A 
comparative analysis,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 138, pp. 
392-412. 
 
Drummond, M. F., M. J. Sculpher, G. W. Torrance, B. J. O'Brien, and G. L. Stoddart, 
(2005), Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care Programmes, Oxford 
University Press, New York, NY, U.S.A.  
 
Dubois, D., and H. Prade, (1978), Operations on fuzzy numbers, International Journal of 
Systems Science, Vol. 9, pp. 613-626. 
 
Dubois, D., and H. Prade, (1980), Fuzzy Sets and Systems: Theory and Applications, 
Academic Press, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
Dubois, D., and H. Prade, (1999), “A unified view of ranking techniques for fuzzy 
numbers,” IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems, Seoul, Korea, 
pp.1328-1333. 
Dyer, J.S., (1990a), “Remarks on the Analytic Hierarchy Process,” Management Science, 
Vol. 36, pp.249-258. 
 
Dyer, J.S., (1990b), ‘A Clarification of “Remarks on the Analytic Hierarchy Process”,’ 
Management Science, Vol. 36, pp. 274-275. 
 
Dyer, J.S., and R.E. Wendell, (1985), “A Critique of the Analytic Hierarchy Process,” 
Technical Report 84/85-4-24, Department of Management, the University of Texas 
at Austin, Austin, TX, U.S.A. 
 
Ellsberg, D. (1961), “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 75, pp. 643-649. 
 
George, J.F., A.R. Dennis, and J.F. Nunamaker, (1992), An Experimental Investigation of 
Facilitation in an EMS Decision Room, Group Decision =egotiation, Vol. 1, pp. 
57-70. 
 
Golden B., E. Wasil, and P. Harker, (1989), The Analytic Hierarchy Process: applications 
and studies, Springer, Berlin, German. 
 
Hackman, J.R., and R.E. Kaplan, (1974), Interventions into group process: An approach 
to improving the effectiveness of groups, Decision Sciences, Vol. 5, pp. 459-480. 
 
Harker, P.T., and L.G. Vargas, (1990), “Reply to 'Remarks on the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process',” Management Science, Vol. 36 (3), pp. 269-273. 
 84
 
Hastie, R., and R.M. Dawes, (2001), Rational choice in an uncertain world, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, U.S.A.  
 
Hobbs, B.F., (1986), “What can we learn from experiments in multiobjective decision 
analysis,” IEEE Trans. On Systems Management and Cybernetics, 16, pp. 384-394. 
 
Hobbs, B.F., V. Chankong, W. Hamadeh, and E. Stakhiv, (1992), “Does choice of 
multi-criteria method matter? An experiment in water resource planning,” Water 
Resources Research, Vol. 28, pp. 1767-1779. 
 
Hobbs, B.F., and P. Meier, (2000), Energy Decisions and the Environment: A Guide to the 
Use of Multicriteria Methods, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, U.S.A. 
 
Hokkanen, J., and P. Salminen, (1997), “Choosing a solid waste management system 
using multi-criteria decision analysis,” European Journal of Operational Research, 
98, pp. 19-36. 
 
Hwang, C.L., and K. Yoon, (1981), Multiple Attribute Decision Making: Methods and 
Applications, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
Jacquet-Lagreze, E., and Y. Siskos, (2001), “Preference Disaggregation: 20 Years of 
MCDA Experience,” Invited Review, European Journal of the Operational 
Research, Vol. 130, pp. 233-245. 
 
Kahneman D., and Tversky A., (1979), Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, 
Econometrica, Vol. 47, pp.263-91.  
 
Kaliszewski, I., and W. Michalowski, (1998), “Establishing Regret Attitude of a Decision 
Maker within the MCDM Modeling Framework,” IR-98-070, International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis. 
 
Keeney, R., and H. Raiffa, (1976), Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and 
Value Tradeoffs, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
Kirkwood, C.W., (1997), Strategic Decision Making: Multiobjective Decision Analysis 
with Spreadsheets, Duxbury Press, ISBN: 0534516920, Belmont, CA, U.S.A. 
 
Kujawski, E., (2005), “A reference-dependent regret model for deterministic tradeoff 
studies,” Systems Engineering, Vol. 8, pp. 119-137. 
 
Laarhoven, P.J.M., and W. Pedrycz, (1983), “A Fuzzy Extension of Saaty’s Priority 
Theory,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 11, pp. 229-241. 
 
Lee-Kwang, H., and J.-H. Lee, (1999), “A method for ranking fuzzy numbers and its 
application to decision-making,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 7, pp. 
 85
677 - 685. 
 
Liao, T.W., A. K. Celmins, and R. J. Hammell II, (2003), “A fuzzy c-means variant for 
the generation of fuzzy term sets,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol.135, pp. 241–257. 
Liou, T.-S., and M.-J. J. Wang, (1992), “Ranking Fuzzy Numbers with Integral Value,” 
Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol.50, pp. 247-255. 
 
Loomes, G., and R. Sugden, (1982), “Regret Theory: an Alternative Theory of Rational 
Choice Under Uncertainty,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 92, pp.805-824. 
 
Lootsma, F.A., (1991), “Scale Sensitivity and Rank Preservation in a Multiplicative 
Variant of the AHP and SMART,” Technical Report 91-67, Faculty of Technical 
Mathematics and Informatics, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The 
Netherlands.  
 
Lootsma, F.A., (1999), Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis via Ratio and Difference 
Judgment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Applied Optimization Series, 29, 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands. 
 
Luce, R.D., (1992), “Where does subjective expected utility fail descriptively?” Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 5, pp. 5-27. 
 
MacVicar-Whelan, P.J., (1978), “Fuzzy sets, the concept of height, and the hedge VERY,” 
IEEE Trans. Systems Man Cybernet, Vol.8(6), pp.507-511. 
 
Masuda, T. (1990). Hierarchical sensitivity analysis of the priorities used in Analytic 
Hierarchy Process, Systems Science, Vol. 21, pp. 415-427. 
 
May, K.O., (1954), “Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 22, pp.1–13.  
 
Mellers, B.A., (2000), “Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences”, Psychological 
bulletin, Vol. 126, pp. 910–924. 
 
Miller, C.A., (1956), “The magic number seven plus or minus two: some limits on our 
capacity for processing information,” Psychological Review, Vol. 13, pp. 81-97. 
 
Miller, D.W., and M.K. Starr, (1969), Executive Decisions and Operations Research, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, U.S.A. 
 
Milnor, J., (1954), Games against nature. In R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs, and R.L. Davis, 
editors, Decision Processes, pp. 49-60, Wiley and Chapman & Hall, New York and 
London. 
 
Norwich, A.M., and I.B. Turksen, (1984), “A model for the measurement of membership 




Plous, S., (1993), The psychology of judgment and decision making, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
Quiggin, J., (1994), “Regret Theory with General Choice Sets,” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, Vol. 8, pp. 153-65.  
 
Raj, P.A., (1995), “Multi-criteria Methods in River Basin Planning- A Case Study,” Water 
Science and Technology, Vol.31, pp. 261–272. 
 
Roberts, F.S., (1972), “What if Utility Functions do Not Exist?” Theory and Decision, 
Vol. 3, pp. 126–139. 
 
Rogers, M.G. and M.P. Bruen, (1999), Applying ELECTRE to an option choice problem 
within an environmental appraisal – three case studies from the Republic of Ireland,  
Chapter 10 in Meskens, N. and Roubens, M. (Eds.), Advances in Decision Analysis, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. 
 
Rogers, M.G., M.P. Bruen, and L.-Y. Maystre, (1999), “Chapter 3: The Electre 
Methodology,” Electre and Decision Support, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston, MA, U.S.A. 
 
Roy, B., (1968), “Classement et choix en presence de points de vue multiples: La methode 
ELECTRE,” R.I.R.O 8, pp. 57-75. 
 
Roy, B., (1978), “ELECTRE III: Un algorithme de classements fonde sur une 
representation floue des preference en presence de criteres multiples,” Cahiers de 
CERO, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 3-24. 
 
Roy, B., (1985), Methodologie Multicritiere d’Aide a la Decision. Econometrica, Paris, 
France. 
 
Roy, B., and P. Bertier, (1971), “La methode ELECTRE II: Une methode de classement en 
presence de critteres multiples,” SEMA (Metra International), Direction Scientifique, 
Note de Travail No. 142, Paris, 25p. 
 
Roy, B., and P. Bertier, (1973), “La methode ELECTRE II: Une methode au 
media-planning,” In Ross, M. (ed.), Operational Research 1972, North-Holland 
Publishing Company, pp. 291-302. 
 
Saaty, T.L., (1980), The Analytic Hierarchy Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
 
Saaty, T.L., (1983), Axiomatic Foundations of the Analytic Hierarchy Process, 
Management Science, Vol. 32, pp. 841-855. 
 
 87
Saaty, T.L., (1987), “Rank Generation, Preservation, and Reversal in the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process,” Decision Sciences, Vol. 18, pp. 157-177.  
 
Saaty, T.L., (1990), 'An Exposition of the AHP in Reply to the Paper "Remarks on the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process",' Management Science, Vol. 36, pp. 259-268. 
 
Saaty, T.L., (1994), Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory with the AHP, 
RWS Publications, Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A. 
 
Saaty, T.L., and L. Vargas, (2000), Models, Methods, Concepts and Applications of the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, U.S.A. 
 
Savage, L.J., (1951), “The theory of statistical decision,” Journal of American Statistical 
Association, Vol. 46, pp.55-67. 
 
Simon H. (1956), “Rational choice and the structure of the environment,” Psychological 
Review, Vol.63, pp. 129-138. 
 
Stewart, T.J., (1992), “A critical survey of the status of multiple criteria decision making 
theory and practice,” OMEGA, Vol. 20, pp. 569-586. 
 
Sugden, R., (1985), “Regret, recrimination and rationality,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 19, 
pp. 77-99. 
 
Triantaphyllou, E., (2000), Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods: A Comparative 
Study, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, U.S.A.  
 
Triantaphyllou, E., (2001), “Two New Cases of Rank Reversals when the AHP and Some 
of its Additive Variants are Used that do not Occur with the Multiplicative AHP,” 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, (May 2001 issue) Vol. 10, pp. 11-25. 
 
Triantaphyllou, E., and S.H. Mann, (1989), "An Examination of the Effectiveness of 
Multi-Dimensional Decision-Making Methods: A Decision-Making Paradox," 
International Journal of Decision Support Systems, No. 5, pp. 303-312. 
 
Triantaphyllou, E., and A. Sanchez, (1997), "A Sensitivity Analysis Approach for Some 
Deterministic Multi-Criteria Decision- Making Methods," Decision Sciences, Vol. 
28, pp. 151-194. 
 
Triantaphyllou, E., F.A. Lootsma, P.M. Pardalos, and S.H. Mann, (1994), "On the 
Evaluation And Application of Different Scales For Quantifying Pairwise 
Comparisons in Fuzzy Sets," Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, Vol.3 (3), 
pp. 133-155. 
 
Troutt, M.D., (1988), “Rank Reversal and the Dependence of Priorities on the Underlying 
MAV Function,” Omega, Vol. 16, pp. 365-367. 
 88
 
Turksen, I.B., (1991), “Measurement of membership functions and their acquisition,” 
Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 40(1), pp.5-38.   
 
Tversky, A., (1969), “Intransitivity of Preferences,” Psychological Review, Vol. 76, pp. 
31–48. 
 
Vaidya, O.S., and S. Kumar, (2006), “Analytic hierarchy process: An overview of 
applications,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 169, pp.1-29. 
 
Wierzbicki, A.P., (1980), The use of reference objectives in multiobjective optimization, 
Multiple Criteria Decision Making; Theory and Applications, (eds G.Fandel and 
T.Gal), Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 177, 468-486, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin, GermanyZadeh, L.A., (1965), Fuzzy sets, Information and 
Control, Vol. 8 (3), pp. 338-353. 
 
Zanakis, S., T. Mandakovic, S.K. Gupta, S. Sahay, and S. Hong, (1995), “A Review of 
Program Evaluation and Fund Allocation Methods within the Service and 
Government Sectors,” Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Vol. 29, pp. 59- 79. 
 
Zanakis, S., A. Solomon, N. Wishart, and S. Dublish, (1998), “Multi-Attribute Decision 
Making: A Comparison of Select Methods,” European Journal of Operational 
Research, Vol. 107, pp. 507-529. 
 
Zavadskas, E.K., L. Ustinovičius, and A. Stasiulionis, (2004), “Multicriteria valuation of 
commercial construction projects for investment purposes,” Journal of Civil 
Engineering and Management, Vol.10, pp. 151-166. 
 
Zeelenberg, M., (1999), “Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behavioral decision 
making,” Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making, Vol.12, pp. 93-106. 
 
Zeelenberg, M., W.W. van Dijk, A. Manstead, and J. van der Pligt, (2000), “On bad 
decisions and disconfirmed expectancies: The psychology of regret and 
disappointment.” Cognition and Emotion, Vol.14, pp. 521- 541. 
 
Zopounidis, C., and M. Doumpos, (2000), Intelligent Decision Aiding Systems Based on 












Ms. Xiaoting Wang is from Shaanxi province in China. She received her Bachelor 
of Science degree in mechatronics engineering at Nanchang Institute of Aeronautical 
Technology, Nanchang, China, in 1999, and a master’s degree in mechatronics 
engineering at Northwestern Polytechnic University, Xi’an, China, in 2002. Xiaoting 
enrolled in the doctoral program in Engineering Science at Louisiana State University in 
the spring of 2003. During her study at LSU, she has finished two master degrees in 
Applied Statistics and Industrial Engineering. Her current research activities mainly focus 
on the theory and applications of multi-criteria decision making (MCDM). 
 
 
 
